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Introduction
This statement o f tax policy presents the recommendations o f
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)
for improving the Social Security retirement system. These rec
ommendations are based on the 1980 edition o f Statement o f Tax
Policy 8, Suggested Improvements fo r the Social Security Retire
ment System, prepared by the AICPA Tax Division.
Statements o f tax policy are approved by the Executive Com 
mittee o f the AICPA Federal Tax Division after they are developed
by the division’s tax policy subcommittee. They represent the views
o f the Institute on key policy issues. The conclusions reached in
the Statements are based on the conditions existent at the time
the Statements are issued. The Institute periodically reviews and,
if necessary, reissues or revises outstanding tax policy statements.
Given the fact that the economic and legislative environment ex
isting when a statement is issued can change dramatically in a
relatively short period o f time, it is possible that the Statement
may, at a given point in time, no longer represent the views o f
the Institute. Thus, should the need to know the Institute’s current
position arise, the reader should check with the AICPA Federal
Tax Division to determine the current status o f this Statement.

Summary of
Recommendations
Since the first edition o f Statement o f Tax Policy 8 was issued
in 1980, there have been several important legislative and admin
istrative actions that have significantly affected the Social Security
1

program. In particular, the President’s National Commission on
Social Security Reform examined the Social Security system and
concluded that Congress “ should not alter the fundamental struc
ture o f the Social Security program or undermine its fundamental
principles.” 1 Subsequent to the Commission’s report, the Congress
enacted amendments to the Social Security Act in 1983 that in
corporated many o f the Commission’s recommendations (an ac
celeration o f legislated future tax increases, increases in the selfemployment tax, increases in the retirement age, and increases in
the scope o f coverage). Several o f these changes were advocated
in Statement o f Tax Policy 8. However, the 1983 amendments did
not alter the fundamental premise on which the system was
founded.
The AICPA maintains that a change in philosophy in the Social
Security program is necessary if the program is to remain viable
and continue to receive public support in the long run. The need
for such a change will be particularly acute as the Social Security
program enters into the twenty-first century. During the early part
o f that century, the number o f beneficiaries will increase dramat
ically in relation to the number o f workers who must bear the
burden o f funding retirement benefits. Without any changes in
the system, it is projected that the Social Security system will once
again begin incurring substantial deficits during this period.2 To
sustain the current benefit payout structure, it will be necessary
to raise payroll taxes, perhaps by as much as 10 percentage points
over the scheduled rates.
Because payroll taxes cannot continue to rise at this rate, these
recommendations focus on the benefits taxpayers should receive
from the system. If adopted, these recommendations could prevent
long-term operating deficits for the retirement portion o f the Social
Security system and could allow for some reduction in Social Se
curity taxes. In addition, these proposals would significantly sim
plify the system and make it more equitable.
The recommendations o f the AICPA are as follows:
1. The present three-tiered benefit structure that weights benefits
in favor o f low-wage earners should be replaced by a level ben
efit structure in which benefits are directly related to each work1. Report o f the National Commission on Social Security Reform (Washington,
D .C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 2-2.
2. For a summary o f the projected financial status o f the Social Security trust
funds, see chapter 1, “ Overview o f the Social Security System.”
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er’s contributions to the retirement system,3 An individual’s
total contributions would include the retirement portion o f both
the employee- and employer-paid contributions, increased by
an earnings factor that includes a real rate o f return. This amount
would be the basis for the earned retirement benefit. To receive
the same retirement annuities, self-employed persons should
contribute an amount equal to the total amount contributed by
both the employee and the employer.
The present system generally pays out retirement benefits in
excess o f the amounts that would be received on the basis o f
an individual’s total contributions to the system. These excess
benefits in effect constitute welfare-type payments.4 Such ex
cess benefits should be subjected to a needs test and funded
by federal general revenues, but should not be part o f the Social
Security system.
Under this benefit proposal, the amounts paid out o f the Social
Security program to persons currently receiving benefits in ex
cess o f an actuarially determined amount (primarily low- and
middle-wage earners and single-wage earner couples) would be
reduced. However, the total benefits received by these persons
would not be reduced because the “ needs” portion o f the re
tirement benefit would be shifted to the Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) program and funded by general revenues. In ad
dition, for present and near-term retirees, the current level o f
scheduled benefits should be guaranteed without tests o f need,
but the excess o f the amounts that they receive over the amounts
that they would collect under the earned computation plan
should come from the SSI program.

2 . Settlement options selected at the time o f retirement should
include (a) a joint-and-survivor annuity (for married couples),
(b) a single-life annuity, or (c) an annuity with a guaranteed
refund feature under which the total retirement contributions
(increased by an earnings factor that reflects a real rate o f return)
would be guaranteed to either the retiree or the estate. Each
individual’s contributions would determine the eventual retire-

3. For a more complete explanation o f how benefits are calculated under the
current Social Security program, see chapter 1 and the Appendix.
4. For a delineation o f the “ earned” from the “windfa ll” benefits under the
current Social Security program, see the analysis in chapter 2, “An Annuity
Analysis o f the Current Social Security Benefit Program.”
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merit benefits. In the event o f death prior to retirement, the
contributions credits or a lump sum distribution would becom e
part o f the estate and could be passed to a surviving spouse or
other legatee. Where both spouses are alive at the retirement
o f one (or both) marriage partner(s), it would be desirable for
the joint-and-survivor election to be mandatory. This would
protect a surviving spouse who has no contributions record o f
his or her own from having all Social Security benefits ended
by the death o f the other spouse. There could be provisions
made for a couple to elect out o f the mandatory joint-and-survivor election if both spouses have earnings records in their
own right.
This recommendation would eliminate much o f the inequity
arising under the present system (a) when persons are taxed
and die before retirement age without having eligible depen
dents and (b) when one spouse dies after both have contributed
to the system during working years. It would also eliminate the
bias that currently exists against single persons and many twowage-earner couples.5
3. The current concept o f funding the Social Security retirement
system should be retained. Presently, contributions paid in by
workers and their employers are used to pay benefits to current
retirees (this is often referred to as the “pay-as-you-go” concept).
A trust fund exists to serve as a contingency fund in case there
is an imbalance between contributions received and benefits
paid out. Ideally, such a fund should be able to provide a cushion
o f between six and nine months o f benefit payments. If the
Social Security program was “ fully funded,” the benefit fund
would be so enormous that it could have a significant effect on
the capital and bond markets. Retention o f the “pay-as-you-go”
concept will leave the trust funds vulnerable to dramatic shifts
in demographic conditions (especially the ratio o f current work
ers to retirees). However, the shifting o f the welfare burden
from the Social Security trust funds to federal general revenues
will lessen the tax burden on future generations o f workers.
Short-term imbalances may still arise, in which case interfund
borrowing or transfers from the general fund may be necessary
to keep the funds in actuarial balance.
5. For a more complete discussion o f the bias that exists in the current program
toward single workers and two-earner couples, see chapter 1 and the analysis in
chapter 2.
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4. The retirement annuity should begin at what society determines
to be an appropriate “ normal retirement age” (e.g., age 65),
unless actuarially reduced benefits beginning at some earlier
age have been elected, regardless o f the participant’s employ
ment status. If early retirement is permitted, the initial annuity
should be based on contributions up to that retirement date.
Wages after early retirement should be subject to Social Se
curity taxation until normal retirement age, thus requiring an
annual recomputation o f the retirement annuity.
Discontinuing the Social Security taxation on earnings after nor
mal retirement age is reached would eliminate all inequities in
the present rules concerning work after that age. Many persons
have difficulty explaining why individuals who need income
should be penalized (i.e., subjected to Social Security taxation
and loss o f Social Security benefits) for working, whereas per
sons with large amounts o f investment income (and thus large
equity interests) collect full Social Security benefits.6
5. For income tax purposes, the retirement portion o f the Social
Security tax assessed against employees and self-employed per
sons should be deductible when it is paid (preferably as a de
duction in computing adjusted gross income), and retirement
benefits should be fully taxable when they are received. The
employer’s contribution should continue to be deductible by
the employer. Because lump-sum distributions (the result
either o f death before retirement age or o f the guaranteed re
fund feature) would be subject to income tax, Congress should
consider some form o f income averaging. A phase-in period
should be allowed to prevent taxation o f benefits resulting from
past contributions that were not deductible. Allowing for the
deductibility o f the em ployee’s portion o f the Social Security
tax would result in a significant reduction in federal income tax
receipts (perhaps as much as $30 billion under 1985 rates). This
would be partially off set when Social Security benefits becom e
fully taxable.
6. Coverage under Social Security should be mandatory for all
workers. Exceptions should continue to exist for short-term
nonresident alien workers.
7. The concept o f earnings sharing should be explored as one
means by which the contributions records o f each spouse would
6. The mechanics o f the “ retirement test” are more fully explained in chapter 1.
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be determined. Under a pure form o f earnings sharing, the
contributions o f each spouse would be combined and divided
equally during the period o f marriage. Each spouse would have
a separate earnings record and could make the decision to retire
independently o f the other spouse. Earnings sharing would also
alleviate the inequity that results under the current system
when one spouse spends a significant period o f time out o f
covered employment (e.g., to care for children) and does not
qualify for benefits based on the other spouse’s earnings record
(e.g., the marriage lasted less than ten years). Despite the sim
plicity o f the concept o f earnings sharing, implementation o f
such a system would be complex and would probably need to
be phased in over a number o f years.7 An alternative to earnings
sharing would be to treat an individual’s contributions record
as a property interest that would be subject to division in any
settlement resulting from the dissolution o f a marriage.

Maintaining the Safety Net
The foregoing recommendations are directed at improving the
nation’s mandatory retirement system. The major thrust o f these
recommendations is that welfare, the actuarially unearned portion
o f the benefits from the Social Security system, should be trans
ferred to the general revenues budget and subjected to a needs
test. Welfare should be an expenditure out o f general revenues,
not payroll tax revenues. To protect low-income retirees from fall
ing below a pre-determined minimum level o f income protection,
it is recommended that the following additional goals be adopted
in conjunction with the suggested changes to the Social Security
program:
1. The Social Security program should be viewed as one part o f a
broader national retirement income program, the other two
parts being private savings and employment-related pension
programs. The role o f Social Security should be to provide a
basic floor o f protection for every worker who has spent a sub
stantial portion o f his or her working life under the Social Se7. For an in-depth analysis o f earnings sharing plans and the resulting imple
mentation problems, see U.S. Department o f Health and Human Services, Re
port on Earnings Sharing Implementation Study (SSA Pub. No. 12-004, January
1985).
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curity program and earned at least the average covered wage,
but not to provide the sole means o f retirement support. In
cases where Social Security, other pension benefits, and savings
fail to provide a determined minimum level o f income, the fu nds
needed to bring an individual to such an income level should
com e from a program such as the Supplemental Security Income
program. Use o f the SSI program to fund income transfer pay
ments is more equitable because it is means-tested and is part
o f the general revenues budget.
2. Congress should continue to provide initiatives for private sav
ings and mandate more uniform pension laws to promote pen
sion equity. However, a goal o f providing a level o f retirement
income that will enable all individuals to maintain their pre
retirement standard o f living should not be a part o f a national
income policy. The legislation o f any mandated universal pen
sion plan (such as the Minimum Universal Pension System, or
MUPS, recommended by the President’s Commission on Pen
sion Policy in 1981) should not be enacted.8 The government
should take actions to encourage people to plan for their income
needs at retirement, but it seems inappropriate for the federal
government to require everyone to forgo current consumption
in favor o f a specified level o f retirement benefits.
3. There should be a federally funded study to establish a valid
minimum income level for retired persons and to examine the
economic implications o f these recommendations. Retirees have
much different income needs than persons who are working or
who have families to support or both. Any minimum income
level needs to take such considerations into account if it is to
be valid.

Implications of Adopting These
Recommendations
The shift o f welfare payments from the Social Security program
could permit a reduction, or at least prevent an increase, in Social
Security taxes. However, the need for general revenue (primarily
8. This plan was advocated by the President’s Commission on Pension Policy in
its report, Coming o f Age: Toward a National Retirement Income Policy (Wash
ington, D .C .: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 41.
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from the income tax) could increase. The tax reduction for Social
Security could exceed the needed additional income tax revenue
because o f the implementation o f the means test under the SSI
program. The entire Social Security tax reduction should result in
reduced labor costs (especially to labor-intensive small businesses)
and increased economic activity, which, in turn, could help reduce
unemployment, lower inflation, and increase capital formation.
The recommendations set forth in this Tax Policy Statement
should be viewed as an integrated plan for change in the Social
Security program. Although certain o f the recommendations could
be implemented without adopting the entire set o f recommenda
tions (e.g., recommendations 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 could be enacted
individually without adopting recommendations 1 and 2), the
AICPA believes that the recommendations should be considered
together and not piecemeal.
Adoption o f these recommendations would represent a radical
departure from the premise on which the Social Security system
has operated almost since its inception. In particular, the emphasis
under this proposal is on the principle o f individual equity as the
primary goal o f the Social Security program. Individual equity is
achieved when each person’s Social Security benefits are actuarially
based on that person’s lifetime contributions. Currently, the pri
mary emphasis o f the Social Security program is on “ social ade
quacy,” which has been defined as a “ welfare objective."9
It is highly likely that benefits paid out o f the Social Security
program would be reduced to many beneficiaries as a result o f
adopting an annuity approach (total benefits to low-income persons
would not necessarily be reduced, however, because o f the SSI
supplement). Such benefit reductions could be cause for political
concern. However, there is no room left in the Social Security
program for political measures that lack fiscal intregrity. Difficult
decisions will have to be made now if future workers can be ex
pected to continue to support the system. Such support is essential
to future beneficiaries, who are dependent on the payments made
by the current workers o f that period. The time for debate on longrange issues is now, while the Social Security program is expected
to experience a period o f solvency. If debate is postponed until
another crisis, the solutions will once again be based on expediency
and not on reasoned debate.
9. For a discussion o f the objectives of “ social adequacy” and “ individual equity”
in the Social Security program, see chapter 1.

8

TAX POLICY ANALYSIS

1
Overview of the Social
Security System
A Basic Description of the Program
The Social Security system is composed o f four distinct pro
grams. The objective o f three o f these programs (the old-age, sur
vivors, and disability programs) is to replace part o f the earnings
lost to a family due to the retirement, death, or disability o f a wage
earner in the family. The fourth program (the hospital program) is
designed to provide health care for the elderly. Each o f these four
programs will be briefly described in this section.

Old-age Insurance (OAI) Program
The old-age insurance program is the largest and most visible
o f the four Social Security programs. It is responsible for providing
monthly cash retirement benefits to qualifying beneficiaries and
their dependents. In fiscal year 1985 this program paid 25.9 million
beneficiaries more than $127 billion in retirement benefits.1 Re
tired workers averaged approximately $5,150 per year in benefits,
while their spouse beneficiaries averaged approximately $3,400 per
year.
1. 1986 Annual Report o f the Board o f Trustees o f the Federal Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance and Disability Trust Funds (Washington, D .C .: U.S. Gov
ernment Printing Office, 1986), pp. 21, 89.
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A person qualifies for retirement benefits in one o f two ways,
either as an “ insured worker” or as a member o f an insured worker’s
family. There are five levels o f insured status, and the level attained
by the worker aff ects not only the availability o f retirement benefits,
but also survivorship, disability, and hospital benefits.
A worker may first apply for retirement benefits upon reaching
age 62 only if the worker is “fully insured. ” The determination o f
fully insured status is made by totaling a worker’s “ quarters o f
coverage. ” A quarter o f coverage is measured by a prescribed dollar
amount o f annual wages or self-employment income that has been
subject to the Social Security tax. For 1986, employees and selfemployed persons receive one quarter o f coverage for each $440
o f covered annual wages, up to a maximum o f four quarters per
year (i.e., a worker who has $1,760 o f covered wages or self-em
ployment income in 1986 receives credit for four quarters o f cov
erage). The amount o f covered wages that represents a quarter o f
coverage is indexed annually by multiplying the ratio o f the average
annual covered wage from the second preceding year (for 1986,
the numerator would be the average covered wage from 1984) over
the average annual covered wage from 1976 times $250. This
amount is rounded to the nearest multiple o f ten. For a person
reaching age 62 in 1986, the minimum number o f quarters nec
essary to qualify for retirement benefits is thirty-five. This will
increase to thirty-six quarters in 1987 and forty quarters in 1991.
Certain dependents o f a fully insured retired worker may also
qualify for benefits based on the worker’s earnings record. These
dependents may be summarized as—
1. A spouse, age 62 or older.
2. An unmarried child under age 18 (age 19 if still in high school).
3. A disabled unmarried child.
4. A spouse under 62 if he or she is caring for the retired worker’s
child who is under age 16 or disabled, provided the child is
receiving a benefit based on the retired worker’s earnings re
cord.
5. A divorced spouse age 62 or older may also qualify for benefits
based on an ex-spouse’s earnings record if the marriage lasted
for ten years or more.
The computation o f the monthly retirement benefit will be
discussed in a subsequent section o f this chapter.
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Survivorship Insurance (SI) Program
The survivorship insurance program is responsible for providing
benefits to qualifying dependents o f a deceased worker who was
“ currently insured” at the time o f death. The survivorship program
is the second largest o f the four programs in terms o f dollar outlay,
paying $38 billion to more than 7.2 million beneficiaries in fiscal
year 1985.2 Benefits to surviving spouses averaged approximately
$5,840 per year in 1984.
Survivorship benefits are restricted to those dependents o f cur
rently insured workers. The number o f quarters o f coverage nec
essary to be considered currently insured increases as a worker
grows older. Regardless o f age, a worker will be considered cur
rently insured if he or she has at least six quarters o f coverage
during the thirteen-quarter period ending with the calendar
quarter in which death occurred.
Dependents who may qualify for survivorship benefits can be
summarized as—
1. A spouse, age 60 or older.
2. An unmarried child under age 18.
3. A disabled unmarried child.
4. A spouse or divorced spouse who is caring for the worker’s child
who is under age 16 or disabled, provided the child is receiving
a benefit based on the deceased worker’s earnings record.
5. A spouse, age 50 or older, who becomes disabled within seven
years after the worker’s death.
6. A worker’s dependent parents age 62 or older.
7. A divorced spouse may qualify for benefits if the marriage lasted
for at least ten years.

Disability Insurance (Dl) Program
The disability insurance program is responsible for providing
benefits to currently disabled workers who have “ disability in
sured” status and to qualifying dependents o f the worker. The
disability insurance program is the smallest o f the four programs,
paying out $18.7 billion to 3.9 million beneficiaries during fiscal
2. 1986 Annual Report, pp. 21, 89.
11

year 1985.3 Disabled workers received an average benefit o f ap
proximately $6,145 per year in 1985.
A worker qualifies for disability payments if that worker is “ dis
ability insured. ” Disability insured status is attained if the worker
has at least twenty quarters o f coverage during the forty-quarter
period ending with the quarter in which the disability occurred.
Special provisions exist for younger workers. In all cases, the dis
ability must be such that it prevents gainful employment, and such
disability is expected to last for at least twelve months or result in
death.
Disability payments are available to a disabled worker up to
the age o f 65 and to the same set o f dependents who are eligible
for a worker’s retirement benefits.

Hospital Insurance (HI) Program
The hospital insurance program, which is one part o f Medicare,
is responsible for subsidizing much o f the cost o f health care for
persons age 65 and over. Medicare is composed o f two parts, hos
pital insurance (Part A) and supplementary medical insurance (Part
B). Part A covers inpatient hospital care, while Part B covers doc
tors’ services, outpatient hospital care, and medical supplies. Part
B is part o f the Social Security system even though it is not financed
by any part o f the payroll tax. The hospital insurance program paid
out $47.6 billion to approximately 27 million beneficiaries during
fiscal year 1985.4

Financing the Social Security Program
The dollars needed to finance the Social Security programs are
raised through the imposition o f a tax on the wages o f employees
in “ covered employment” and on net income derived from selfemployment. These dollars are allocated among three trust funds,
the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund, the Dis
ability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund, and the Hospital Insurance (HI)
3. 1986 Annual Report, pp. 26, 92.
4. 1986 Annual Report o f the Board o f Trustees o f the Federal Hospital Insurance
Trust Fund (Washington, D .C .: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 2.
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Trust Fund. The trust fund reserves are invested in interest-bear
ing obligations o f the U.S. government or in exclusively issued
public debt obligations. The average interest rate earned by these
funds in fiscal year 1985 was 12.4 percent.5
Despite the existence o f trust funds for each Social Security
program, it is important to recognize that the Social Security sys
tem is not actuarially funded. Instead, the system operates on a
“ pay-as-you-go” basis, with the funds currently received being used
to finance the current benefits. This method o f operation, also
referred to as “ current cost” financing, attempts to match current
year revenues with current year expenditures. The trust funds
serve as contingency reserves to guard against fluctuations due to
unforeseen changes in economic conditions.
The “ pay-as-you-go” approach to financing the Social Security
programs creates unique inter-generational compacts between cur
rent beneficiaries, current workers, and future generations o f work
ers. In the absence o f any funded retirement system, the tax rate
borne by current workers becomes a function not o f their future
retirement benefits, but rather it is determined by the level o f
current retirement benefits. Current workers must then rely on
future workers to continue to support the retirement system when
they retire.

Who Is Taxed
Although Social Security payments are often characterized as
“ contributions,” participation in the Social Security program is, for
the most part, mandatory for both employers and employees and
self-employed persons. More than 90 percent o f the current work
force (122 million workers in fiscal year 1985) is covered under the
Social Security program. Prior to the 1983 Amendments to the
Social Security Act, the following groups o f workers were exempt
from participation in the program:
1. Federal civilian employees covered under another U.S. retire
ment system
2. Employees o f state and municipal governments that were not
covered by a federal-state agreement or that elected to withdraw
from the program
5. 1986 Annual Report o f the Board o f Trustees o f the Federal Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, p. 23.
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3. Employees o f certain nonprofit organizations that had not ar
ranged for Social Security coverage
The 1983 Amendments extended coverage on a mandatory basis
to newly hired federal employees and current and future employees
o f nonprofit organizations. In addition, the amendments prohibited
state and local governments from electing out o f the system after
April 20, 1983.

What Is Taxed
The Social Security tax is a payroll tax, applied only to the
“ covered” wages o f employees and the net employment income o f
self-employed persons. Passive sources o f income such as invest
ment income, rents, and capital gains are not subject to the Social
Security tax. The maximum amount o f total wages and net selfemployment income that is subject to tax is defined as the “ con
tribution and benefit base.” For 1986, this ceiling is set at $42,000.
This amount is indexed each year by the ratio o f the average cov
ered wage from the second preceding year over the average cov
ered wage from the third preceding year (for 1986, the index was
the 1984 average covered wage [$16,135.07] divided by the 1983
average covered wage [$15,239.24] times the 1985 contribution
and benefit base [$39,600]). The resulting number is rounded to
the nearest multiple o f $300. For 1987, the contribution and benefit
base is scheduled to increase to $43,800.

How Much Is Taxed
The Social Security tax itself is a flat rate that is applied to
covered earnings up to the contribution and benefit base. Em
ployers and employees split the flat rate evenly, while self-em
ployed persons are subject to the entire rate. Prior to the 1983
Amendments to the Social Security Act, self-employed persons
paid a rate that was approximately two-thirds the com bined em 
ployer-em ployee rate. Under a transition provision, self-employed
persons will receive a credit against their federal income tax o f 2.7
percent times covered wages in 1984, 2.3 percent in 1985, and 2.0
percent in 1986 to 1989. Beginning in 1990, self-employed persons
will be allowed a deduction against their federal taxable income o f
one-half o f their total Social Security tax paid. For 1984 only, em 
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ployees (but not employers) also received a credit against their
federal income tax o f 0.3 percent o f covered wages. Employees are
not permitted to deduct any o f their Social Security taxes against
their taxable income.
The total Social Security tax rate levied in 1987 is 7.15 percent
each for employers and employees and 14.3 percent for self-em
ployed persons. The combined em ployer-em ployee rate is allo
cated to the three trust funds in the following manner in 1987:
OASI

10.4%

DI

1 .0 %

HI

2.9%

Under current law, the combined rate is scheduled to increase
to 15.02 percent in 1988, with additional increases scheduled to
take effect in 1990 and 2000, reaching a maximum com bined rate
o f 15.3 percent (7.65 percent each for employers and employees).
These rates are subject to change if economic conditions precipitate
a shortfall or surplus in the trust funds.

Computing Social Security
Benefit Amounts
A worker’s initial monthly retirement or disability benefit is
based on the worker’s “ primary insurance amount” (PIA). The PIA
becomes the base from which almost all o f the cash benefits are
computed, including dependent and survivorship benefits.
There are currently five basic types o f PIA computation meth
ods. They are: (1) PIA table method, (2) wage-indexed formula
method, (3) transitional guarantee method, (4) old-start method,
and (5) special minimum method. The wage-indexed formula
method will apply to the vast majority o f workers who reach age
62 after 1978 or becom e disabled before reaching age 62. The
mechanics o f this method will be briefly summarized in this section.

Wage-indexed Formula Method
The wage-indexed formula method was introduced in the 1977
Amendments to the Social Security Act to apply to beneficiaries
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reaching age 62 after 1978. The objective o f this method is to index
a retiree’s past covered earnings to reflect increases in the average
covered wages of all workers over the worker’s period o f employ
ment. Under this formula, a worker’s actual covered wages for each
year up to and including the second year before the year in which
the worker turns 62, dies, or becomes disabled are indexed by
multiplying the actual covered wage times the following ratio:
Average covered annual wage in the second year
________ prior to age 62, death, or disability________
Average covered annual wage in the year indexed

Those wages not indexed are included in the formula at their actual
amounts.
The computation period used in the formula consists o f the
years beginning after 1950 or age 21 (whichever is later) and ex
tending up to the year in which the worker becomes 62, dies, or
becomes disabled (whichever is earliest). The five years o f lowest
indexed earnings are dropped, and years o f earnings beginning
with age 62 are substituted for years o f lower indexed earnings
included in the computation period.
The remaining indexed and actual wages in the computation
period are summed and divided by the number o f months in the
computation period to produce an “average indexed monthly earn
ing” (AIME). The AIME becomes the basis for the computation
o f the worker’s PIA.
The PIA is computed by applying three separate percentage
rates to portions o f the AIME. The dollar amounts o f AIM E at
which the percentage rate changes are referred to as “ bend points. ”
As originally enacted for 1979, the PIA percentage rates and bend
points were:
9 0 % X first $180 o f A IM E , plus
3 2 % X A IM E over $180 and through $1085, plus
15% X A IM E over $1085.

The bend points are indexed each year by multiplying the bend
point times the ratio o f the average annual covered wage for the
second preceding year over the average annual covered wage for
1977. The bend points for 1986 are as follows:
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9 0 % X first $297 o f A IM E , plus
3 2 % X A IM E over $297 and through $1790, plus
15% X A IM E over $1790.

The amount computed using this formula is rounded to the next
lower multiple o f $0.10. A complete example o f the operation o f
this formula is presented in the Appendix. It should be emphasized
that the benefit received is strictly a function o f covered wages.
At no time does the actual amount o f tax paid enter into the com 
putation.
Once the PIA is computed, future benefits are automatically
increased (subject to Congressional approval) to reflect changes in
the cost o f living index (CPI). If the CPI monthly average for the
third quarter o f the current year is at least 3 percent higher than
in the third quarter o f the preceding year, the monthly benefit is
increased by the increase in the CPI, effective in January o f the
next year. Should the CPI increase not exceed 3 percent, Congress
may still authorize an increase in Social Security benefits if it
chooses to do so (as it did in 1987).

Adjustments to the Monthly Benefit
There are three major adjustments that can affect the amount
o f monthly benefit actually received. These adjustments may be
classified as (1) an actuarial reduction or increase to the PIA, (2)
CPI increases, and (3) a retirement test reduction.
The actuarial reduction or increase factor is applied to the PIA
if a worker retires prior to “normal retirement age” (age 65 in 1985)
or continues working beyond normal retirement age. In 1985, a
worker may apply for retirement benefits as early as age 62, but
such benefits are reduced by five-ninths o f 1 percent for each
retirement month prior to age 65. For a person retiring at age 62
in 1985, the retirement benefit will be 80 percent o f the PIA. The
amount o f the reduction is scheduled to increase as the normal
retirement age is raised. By the year 2005, the normal retirement
age will be age 66 and the reduced benefit for retiring at age 62
will drop to 75 percent o f the PIA. By the year 2022, the normal
retirement age will be age 67 and the reduced benefit for retiring
at age 62 will drop to 70 percent o f the PIA. Conversely, if a worker
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continues working beyond age 65 in 1985, the monthly benefit is
increased by one-fourth o f 1 percent for each month worked beyond
age 65 (or 3 percent per full year). In conjunction with the sched
uled increases in normal retirement age, the actuarial increase
factor is also scheduled to be increased for working beyond the
normal retirement age, reaching a maximum o f 8 percent per year
by 2009.
In addition to the automatic CPI adjustment applied to the
monthly benefit after entitlement, the initial PIA is increased by
the CPI fa ctor for each year beginning with age 62 up to the last
year o f earnings. This is to compensate for the fact that such years
are not indexed in the PIA computation formula.
A final adjustment to the initial monthly benefit or to subse
quent monthly benefits is the decrease in benefits due to covered
wages or self-employment income earned during the retirement
year. This ‘‘retirement test” applies to only those persons under
age 70. Persons who reach age 70 may earn an unlimited amount
o f covered wages or self-employment income and still collect their
fu ll Social Security retirement benefit. For persons between ages
65 through 69 during 1986, retirees are permitted to earn $650
per month ($7,800 per year) without suff ering any loss o f benefits.
For each dollar earned above this amount, the retirement benefit
is reduced by $0.50. This amount drops to $0.333 starting in 1990.
The exempt amount for beneficiaries under age 65 during 1986 is
$480 per month ($5,760 per year). It is important to note that only
covered wages and self-employment income are subject to the
retirement test. A retiree o f any age may earn an unlimited amount
o f investment income during the retirement period without loss o f
Social Security benefits. The retirement test has been defended
on the grounds that the Social Security program is designed to
replace lost earnings, not to augment current earnings.6

Computing Benefits for Dependents of the Worker
The worker’s PIA becomes the base from which the retirement,
survivorship, and disability benefits o f qualifying members o f the
6. For an interesting discussion o f this issue, see Martha Derthick, Policymaking
for Social Security (Washington, D .C .: The Brookings Institution, 1979), p. 226.
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worker s family are computed. Qualifying spouses and dependents
are generally entitled to one-half o f the worker s PIA, except that
the total amount received by the worker and his or her family is
limited to a “ maximum family benefit” (MFB). The MFB is com 
puted by applying four separate percentage rates to the worker s
PIA. The MFB percentage rates and the PIA bend points for 1986
are as follows:
150%
272%
134%
175%

X
X
X
X

first $379 of the PIA, plus
the PIA over $379 and through $548; plus
the PIA over $548 and through $714; plus
the PIA over $714.

The resulting sum is rounded to the next lower multiple o f $0.10.
If the worker dies before or during retirement, a qualifying
spouse is entitled to 100 percent o f the worker’s PIA and qualifying
children are eligible for 75 percent o f the PIA, up to the MFB.
For a retired married couple in which one spouse is collecting
benefits based on the PIA o f the other spouse, the total benefits
received are analogous to a joint and two-thirds survivor annuity
(the total benefit received by the surviving spouse drops from 150
percent o f the PIA to 100 percent o f the PIA after the death o f
one o f the spouses).
In the case o f a worker who dies before receiving any benefits,
the worker’s surviving spouse is entitled to a lump sum death
benefit o f not more than $255 in addition to survivorship benefits
when he or she qualifies. For a married couple in which both
spouses are entitl ed to a retirement benefit based on their indi
vidual earnings records or for unmarried workers, the earnings
credits earned by the deceased worker are nontransferable and no
part o f any past “premiums” (taxes) paid are refunded to the de
ceased worker’s estate.

Income Tax Status of Social Security Benefits
Beginning in 1984, up to one-half o f the Social Security benefits
received by an individual or married couple may be subject to
taxation as gross income (section 86 o f the Internal Revenue Code
o f 1954). The following formula is used to determine if such benefits
are taxable;
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Adjusted gross income (AGI)
+ Tax-exempt interest income
-I- 1/2 o f Social Security benefits received
Total
— Base amount ($25,000 if single, $ 3 2 ,0 0 0 if married filing jointly)
X

Difference
1/2
Taxable benefit (not to exceed one-half o f the benefits received)

Prior to 1984, the entire amount o f Social Security benefits
received was exempt from federal income taxation under a series
o f Internal Revenue Service rulings issued in 1938 and 1941.

The Philosophical Foundation of the
Social Security Program
The principle that a tax system should result in equitable treat
ment o f its taxpayers has traditionally been a standard by which
tax systems are developed and evaluated. In the most frequent
case, “ equity” is measured on a relative basis. D o “ equally situated”
taxpayers pay the same amount o f taxes (horizontal equity)? Do
“ unequally situated” taxpayers pay different amounts o f taxes (ver
tical equity)? The emphasis in the definition o f “ equity” is on the
relative amount o f taxes paid, with little or no consideration given
to the relative amount o f benefits received in exchange for the
payments. This is a reasonable approach in light o f the difficulty
that exists in determining and measuring the value (or utility) o f
each person’s “public goods” received (e.g., highways, national
defense) in exchange for taxes paid.
The Social Security tax is unique from our other tax systems
in that the direct benefits to be received as a result o f paying the
tax can be defined and measured in monetary terms. In fact, some
have argued that Social Security payments are not “ taxes” in the
purest sense because there exists a direct measure between taxes
paid and benefits received. Such persons would prefer to view the
Social Security “ taxes” as “ contributions.”7The compulsory nature
7. See, for example, Wilbur J. Cohen and Milton Friedman, Social Security:
Universal or Selective (Washington, D .C .: American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1972) and Robert M. Ball, Social Security Today and
Tomorrow (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 7-9.
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o f these payments and the lack o f any contractual guarantee (other
than moral) o f benefits reduces the validity o f this argument con
siderably.
This expansion o f the equity concept from a relative to an ab
solute measure in evaluating the Social Security program would
be appropriate if the sole purpose o f the Social Security program
was to function as a retirement annuity program, where each per
son’s benefits were directly related to contributions made. Al
though many participants probably think o f the program as such,
it is more accurate to view Social Security as designed to provide
economic security to those workers and their dependents who have
lost their source o f wages because o f retirement, disability, or
death. Social Security, as it presently functions, can better be
described as “ social insurance,” with the distinction being that the
program emphasizes the imputed need o f the beneficiary over
individual actuarial equity, the latter being measured on a quid
pro quo basis.

Social Adequacy Goals of the Social Security Program
The program goal o f emphasizing imputed need over strict
actuarial equity is most often referred to as the principle o f “ social
adequacy.” Social adequacy has been defined as
a welfare objective in which an individual’s benefit amount is deter
mined, not by his or her contributions, but by (a) appropriate transfer
o f income from affluent to needy groups, and (b) a minim um standard
o f living beneath which society decides that no individual shall fall.8

While this definition o f social adequacy may be correct in prin
ciple, it fails to mention that under the current Social Security
provisions, there is no means test applied to the recipients o f ben
efits. It is possible that an “ affluent” person (as measured by total
wealth) could collect the same benefit as a “ needy” person and
have paid in the same number o f dollars in tax. It is also more
accurate to say that the transfer o f income does not necessarily
come from the “ affluent,” whose income may be largely exempt
from the Social Security tax (e.g., interest, dividends, capital gains,
rents), but rather from the middle- and low-wage earner, the single
worker, or the two-wage-earner couple.
8. Report o f the Consultant Panel on Social Security to the Congressional
Research Service (Washington, D .C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976),
p. 12.
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If social adequacy was the sole objective o f the program, there
would be little concern for the correlation between taxes paid and
benefits received. It could then be argued that such welfare ob
jectives should more properly be funded by general revenues and
not a payroll tax. Such is not the case, however. While policymakers
admit that social adequacy is the primary objective o f the program,
they also have recognized that individual (actuarial) equity is im
portant if the program is to continue to receive public support in
the future. The 1979 Advisory Council on Social Security recog
nized the importance o f retaining some relationship between ben
efits and taxes when it stated that “ all current and future workers
should be able to expect that Social Security benefits generated
by increased earnings will provide a reasonable return on the in
creased employee tax payments on those earnings.” 9
Striking an acceptable balance between social adequacy and
individual equity is a difficult task because the two objectives are
mutually exclusive. Provisions that promote the objective o f social
adequacy do so at the expense o f individual equity. In addition,
the fact that Social Security is not a funded plan requires that equity
be considered from both an intragenerational and an intergener
ational perspective. The Report o f the Consultant Panel on Social
Security states that
complete equity between generations demands that those diff erent
generations receive comparable benefit amounts in return for com 
parable contributions. Ultimate equity within a generation exists only
if workers’ benefits are directly proportional to the amounts o f their
contributions,

Recent pronouncements from Social Security policymakers and
the Reagan Administration have tended to reinforce the goal of
social adequacy as an essential component o f the program. Presi
dent Reagan’s bipartisan National Commission on Social Security
Reform unanimously agreed that
the Congress, in its deliberations on financing proposals, should not
alter the fundamental structure o f the Social Security program or
undermine its fundamental principles. The National Com mission con
sidered, but rejected, proposals to make the Social Security program

9. Reports o f the 1979 Advisory Council on Social Security, Social Security
Financing and Benefits, p. 5.
10. Report o f the Consultant Panel on Social Security to the Congressional Re
search Service, p. 13.
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a voluntary one, or to transform it into a program under which benefits
are a product exclusively of the contributions paid, or to convert it
into a fu lly-fu n ded program, or to change it to a program under which
benefits are conditioned on the showing of financial need.11

The Economics of Social Security
The Social Security program is currently the largest single pro
gram in the federal budget. Outlays for Social Security and M ed
icare are projected to comprise approximately 28 percent o f total
budget outlays for 1987. This is slightly more than the national
defense outlays, which are estimated to comprise 27.4 percent o f
the budget.1
2 Receipts from Social Security taxes are currently the
second-largest source o f federal tax revenues. For 1987, it is es
timated that Social Security taxes will account for 39.2 percent o f
total federal tax revenues. This compares to 42.2 percent for in
dividual income taxes and 12.5 percent for corporate income
taxes.1
3
The magnitude o f the Social Security program is impressive in
absolute terms. To appreciate the growing impact o f the program
on our economy, however, one only needs to examine the growth
o f the program during the past twenty-five years. The following
two sections trace the growth o f the Social Security program from
the perspective o f both the expenditures and the receipts.

The Growth of Social Security Expenditures
The Social Security program began paying benefits in 1940. In
that year, Social Security outlays accounted for 0.3 percent o f total
budget outlays. In 1950, amendments were made to the program
that liberalized eligibility for benefits and extended compulsory
coverage to most nonfarm self-employed persons. In that year,
Social Security outlays increased to 1.8 percent o f total budget
outlays. In 1956, disability benefits were added, and the age o f
11. Report o f the National Commission on Social Security Reform (Washington,
D .C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 2-2.
12. U.S. Office o f Management and Budget, Special Analysis Budget o f the
United States Government, 1988 (Washington, D .C .: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1987), p. B-2.
13. Ibid.
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entitlement was reduced to age 62 for women. Outlays increased
to 7.8 percent o f the budget. Medicare was added in 1965, and
this raised the outlay percentage to 14.8 percent. Automatic wage
and benefit indexing was introduced in 1972 and modified sub
stantially in 1977. By 1972, the outlay percentage had grown to
20.7 percent, and it increased to 25.5 percent in 1977. By 1985,
this percentage exceeded 28 percent. A comparison o f the per
centage change in outlays in the federal budget fr om 1960 to 1988
is presented in figure 1.1, which is taken from the Special Analysis
Budget o f the United States Government, 1988. The growth in
domestic transfer payments (much o f which can be attributed to
Social Security) as a percentage o f the budget is evident from this
figure.
In addition to its growth in absolute dollars, Social Security
program spending has also increased significantly in terms o f real
(indexed) dollars. From 1962 to 1981, Social Security benefits grew
at a real growth rate o f 8.7 percent. Since 1981, program cuts and
Social Security reforms have lowered the real growth rate to ap
proximately 3.4 percent.14

The Growth of Social Security Taxes
The growth o f Social Security taxes as a percent o f total federal
receipts has been dramatic since their imposition in 1937. In 1940,
the first year o f payments, Social Security taxes actually accounted
for 27.3 percent o f total tax receipts (by contrast, individual income
taxes accounted for 13.6 percent o f total tax receipts and corporate
income taxes accounted for 18.3 percent). Expansion o f the income
tax system to help pay for World War II raised the individual
income tax percentage to 45.0 percent in 1944 and the corporate
income tax percentage to 33.9 percent. This had the effect o f low
ering the Social Security percentage to 7.9 percent.15 Since that
time, the individual income tax percentage has remained in the
range o f 40 to 45 percent o f total tax receipts. Over the same period,
there has been a gradual decline in the percentage raised by the
14. U.S. Office o f Management and Budget, Major Themes and Additional Bud
get Details, F Y 1985 (Washington, D .C .; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984),
p. 112.
15. U.S. Office o f Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Budget o f the
United States Government, 1986 (Washington, D .C .: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1985), pp. 2.2(1)-2.2(2).
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Figure 1.1
Distribution of Federal Sector Expenditures by Category,
1960-1988

Source: Special Analysis Budget o f the United States Government,
1988, p. B-3.

corporate income tax and a steady rise in the percentage raised by
Social Security taxes.
Since 1968, the percentage raised by Social Security taxes has
exceeded that raised by corporate income taxes such that in 1987
Social Security taxes will raise more than four times the tax rev
enues raised through the corporate income tax. This change in the
percentage o f tax dollars raised by each tax revenue source can be
seen in figure 1.2, which is also taken from the Special Analysis

Budget o f the United States Government, 1988.
One consequence o f the increase in the Social Security tax has
been to increase significantly the size and nature o f the tax burden
on low- and middle-income workers. As reported by the President’s
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Distribution
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Figure 1.2
Federal Sector Receipts
1960-1988

by

Category,

Distribution of Federal Sector Receipts by Category
Percent

Percent

1960

64

88
Estimate

Fiscal Years

Source; Special Analysis Budget o f the United States Government,

1988, p. B-6.
National Commission on Social Security Reform, Social Security
taxes paid by the average worker (including the employer-paid
portion) have increased 2,011 percent between 1950 and 1980, as
compared with a 594 percent increase in federal income taxes paid
and a 490 percent increase in wages.1
6 The net result, as reported
in the Special Analysis Budget o f the United States Government,
1988, is that
As a result of the rapid rise in social insurance taxes (mainly social
security) and the passage of legislation reducing or eliminating indi16. Report o f the National Commission on Social Security Reform (Washington,
D .C .: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), Statement (7), p.
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vidual in com e taxes for many low - and m od era te-in com e individuals
and families, millions o f Am ericans n ow pay significantly h igh er social
insurance taxes than in com e taxes.1
7

One might assume under a “ pay-as-we-go” funding philosophy,
that whenever Social Security benefits are increased, there would
be a commensurate increase in Social Security taxes to pay for the
increased expenditures. Such has generally not been the case, at
least not until the early 1970s. Benefit increases in the 1950s and
1960s were not accompanied by tax increases o f the same magni
tude, Instead, Congress chose to draw down the reserves in the
trust funds to make up part o f the difference between receipts and
outlays. Such actions ultimately led to an impending insolvency o f
the retirement trust fund in 1984. The immediate insolvency was
prevented by allowing inter-fund borrowing from the disability and
hospital trust funds and by the enactment o f tax increases coupled
with the deferral o f expenditures in the 1983 Amendments to the
Social Security Act.
The rise in Social Security taxes, the much publicized near
insolvency o f the Old-Age and Survivors Trust Fund, and record
federal budget deficits have combined to focus attention once again
on the size o f the Social Security program and the premise on
which it was founded. This last section will discuss short- and longrange concerns that have been voiced about the Social Security
program as it prepares to begin its second 50 years o f existence.

Concerns About the Social Security
Program in 1987 and Beyond
Despite the changes made in the Social Security program by
the 1983 Amendments to the Social Security Act to alleviate the
imbalance between revenues and expenditures (e.g., acceleration
o f tax increases, expansion of covered employment, increase in the
retirement age, deferral o f cost o f living adjustments), there still
exist both short- and long-range concerns about both the financial
health and the perceived fairness o f the current Social Security
system. In particular, concerns continue to be expressed about
17. Special Analysis Budget o f the United States Government, 1988, pp. B-4, 5.
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(1) the fragility o f the financial solvency o f the trust funds in the
short run, (2) the cost to support the program in the long run, (3)
the unequal treatment o f spouses under the current system, and
(4) the degree to which a fair return on Social Security payments
can be guaranteed to all participants in the program. These four
concerns will be discussed in this section o f this report.

The Financial Solvency of the Trust Funds in the Short Run
Beginning in 1976 and continuing through 1983, the disburse
ments from the Old-Age and Survivors Trust Fund exceeded the
income to the fund in each month. The trust fund balance was
reduced from $39.9 billion at the beginning o f 1976 to $9.1 billion
at the end o f 1983. If it were not for a loan o f $17.5 billion from
the disability and hospital trust funds, the retirement trust fund
would not have been able to meet its obligations in 1983.
The combination o f accelerated tax increases, an improved
economy, and lower inflation rates has resulted in a much improved
picture for the OASI trust fund in the near future. According to
the 1986 Annual Report o f the Board o f Trustees o f this fund,
inflows into the fund during fiscal year 1985 exceeded outflows by
$9.4 billion.18 The report stated that benefits could be paid “ for
many years into the future, on the basis o f all four sets o f economic
and demographic assumptions.” 19 In the short range (1986 to 1990),
it is estimated that income to the fund will exceed outflows in each
year. For the years 1986 through 2010, a surplus varying from 1.01
to 3.21 percent o f taxable payroll is projected. However, the cur
rent balance in the trust fund is still precarious. The trustees note
that the trust fund levels are estimated to remain low through 1987
and need to be carefully monitored.20 After 1987, it is projected
that the trust fund’s ability to withstand temporary economic down
turns will improve steadily.
The optimism over the financial status o f the retirement trust
fund, while generally acknowledged, is not universally shared. A
recent economic study published by the Committee for Economic
Development (CED) expresses strong reservations about the va-

18. 1986 Annual Report o f the Board o f Trustees o f the Federal Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, p. 3.
19. Ibid.
20. 1986 Annual Report, p. 65.
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lidity o f the economic assumptions used in preparing the forecasts
for the retirement trust fund.21 The concern o f the C E D is that
the range o f assumptions used is too narrow in light o f past ex
perience. In any case, it appears safe to speculate that an economic
downturn o f the magnitude experienced in 1981 and 1982 would
once again threaten the financial solvency o f the retirement trust
fund if it occurred in the next several years.

The Financial Solvency of the Trust Funds in the Long Run
The 1986 Annual Report o f the Board o f Trustees o f the re
tirement trust fund estimates that beginning after the year 2020,
the trust fund will once again begin experiencing annual deficits
between inflows and outflows. The average annual deficit under
the trustees’ “ realistic” assumption (Alternative II-B) for the period
from 2036 to 2060 is projected to be 2.24 percent o f taxable payroll
for the retirement trust fund only. Under the “pessimistic” as
sumptions (Alternative III), this annual deficit could average as
high as 9.10 percent o f taxable payroll. Translated, this means that
the combined payroll tax paid by employees and employers would
have to be increased by 9.10 percentage points to fund the benefit
payments. When the OASDI cost is combined with the cost to
support the hospital trust fund, the total payroll tax rate necessary
to support the Social Security program during the period from
2036 to 2060 is projected to be almost 24 percent using the “ re
alistic” assumptions and could reach as high as 40 percent under
the “ pessimistic” assumptions. It should be pointed out that the
“ realistic” assumptions use an inflation rate o f 4.0 percent and an
unemployment rate o f 6.0 percent, while the “ pessimistic” as
sumptions use an inflation rate o f 5.0 percent and an unemploy
ment rate o f 7.0 percent. Even using the “ realistic” assumptions,
a self-employed person would be required to “ contribute” onequarter o f his or her net self-employment income to the Social
Security program to keep it solvent under the current financing
arrangement.
The projected deficits in the Social Security trust funds over
the long run are the result o f projected structural changes in de
mography rather than projected economic performance. In partic21. Committee for Economic Development, Social Security: From Crisis to Cri
sis (New York; Committee for Economic Development, 1984), pp. 9-10.

29

ular, the ratio o f beneficiaries to workers is projected to change
dramatically due to (1) a rapid growth in the aged population (due
to the retirement o f the post-World War II babies), (2) improve
ments in mortality rates (average life expectancy is at an all-time
high o f 74.6 years), and (3) a significant drop in birth rates (fewer
workers are being added to the population). W hile the ratio o f
workers to beneficiaries was 16.5:1 in 1950, it is projected to decline
to 1.9:1 in 2030.22 Under a “pay-as-you-go” funding arrangement,
this means that each retiree’s benefits will be dependent on the
contributions o f only two workers.

The Treatment of Spouses Under the Present
Social Security Program
In addition to the demographic changes that threaten the longrun financial solvency o f the Social Security program, there are
also demographic changes that threaten the perceived (and actual)
equity o f the benefit structure. In particular, the 1970s began a
period o f rapid change in the composition o f the U.S. workforce
and in the divorce rates. When the Social Security program was
founded in 1935, the divorce rate was minimal and more than 80
percent o f all households were supported by one working spouse.
Today both o f these statistics have changed dramatically. Over half
(51 percent in 1982) of all married women are engaged in paid
employment (49 percent o f the married mothers o f preschool chil
dren), and approximately half o f all first marriages end in divorce
(the average length o f marriage is currently about 9.5 years).2
3
The current Social Security dependency rules (see earlier dis
cussion in this chapter) have not been changed to reflect the socio
economic changes that have occurred since 1935. As a result, many
second-wage earners in a marriage discover that they have paid in
significant amounts o f Social Security taxes on their lifetime earn
ings and still qualify for benefits based on their spouse’s earnings
record. A one-wage-earner couple could receive identical retire
ment benefits as the two-wage-earner couple and have paid sig
nificantly less in Social Security taxes. In addition, should one o f

22. 1986 Annual Report, p. 73.
23. Arland Thornton and Deborah Freedman, “The Changing American Family;
Marriage and Divorce,” Economic Outlook USA (Ann Arbor: University o f Mich
igan, 1984), pp. 39-43.
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the workers in a two-wage-earner family die before reaching re
tirement, the surviving spouse would receive benefits based on
the earnings record o f only one o f the marriage partners. The
economic benefit o f the retirement portion o f the Social Security
contributions of one o f the two partners will be lost to the family
unit, except for a $255 death benefit.
In addition to the bias against the two-wage-earner couple,
there also exists a bias against the spouse who gives up covered
employment to raise a family. Under the current provision, a
spouse must remain married for at least 10 years before he or she
is entitled to retirement benefits based on the earnings record o f
the other spouse. In light of the fact that the average marriage lasts
only 9.5 years, it appears safe to assume that an increasing number
o f nonemployed spouses are being left with no earnings record for
a substantial period o f time and no Social Security credits for the
time spent supporting the ex-spouse during the marriage. Although
most o f these divorced persons eventually remarry or build up
work records o f their own, the current arrangement is still ineq
uitable.
O f even more concern to most policymakers is the financial
condition o f widows who have reached retirement age. A recent
study undertaken by the Social Security Administration revealed
that retired widows had a median income that was 78 percent of
that o f retired nonmarried men and 37 percent o f that o f retired
couples. The cause for this discrepancy was not attributed to the
structure o f the current Social Security program, however. Rather,
the low economic state o f many widows was more closely related
to the fact that these persons tended to have few sources o f income
other than Social Security b e n e f i t s . 2
Such a finding reinforces the
4
need to more broadly define retirement policy to include private
savings and pension plans along with Social Security (see chapter
3 for a broader discussion o f national retirement policy).
A solution that has been proposed to mitigate the marriage
inequities that can occur under the present system is the imple
mentation o f some form o f earnings sharing among spouses. In its
most basic form, earnings sharing can be defined as a plan in which
“ the combined earnings o f a husband and wife during the period
o f their marriage shall be divided equally and shared between them

24. U.S. Department o f Health and Human Services, Report on Earnings Shar
ing Implementation Study (SSA Pub. No. 12-004, January 1985), p. 10.
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for social security benefit purposes.” 25 The premise behind the
earnings sharing concept is that marriage should be viewed as an
economic partnership in which assets (such as Social Security earn
ings credits) should be divided equally between the spouses. A
“pure” earnings sharing plan would credit each spouse with half
o f the couple’s total covered earnings for each year o f marriage and
replace the current benefit structure with one in which each spouse
would have a separate earnings record for benefit computation
purposes. In its report on earnings sharing, the Social Security
Administration estimated that about 64 percent o f the male ben
eficiaries and 37 percent o f the female beneficiaries who would be
age 62 or older in 2030 would receive reduced benefits under a
generic earnings sharing plan without any transition plan.26
The crucial issues that must be resolved if an earnings sharing
concept is to be implemented are: (1) phasing in the plan for current
workers and (2) determining the extent to which earnings are to
be shared.27 Under any earnings sharing plan, there would have
to be safeguards to insure that current workers who have partici
pated in the system for a substantial number o f years receive ben
efits that parallel what they would receive under the current law.
In every case, it would appear that earnings sharing would have
to be implemented on a prospective basis because o f the near
impossibility o f reconstructing accurate earnings records for mem
bers o f the current workforce who have been divorced, remarried,
etc.

The Actuarial Fairness of the Current
Social Security Program
The current Social Security benefit structure is weighted to
provide the low-income worker with a higher retirement income
replacement rate than the high-income worker. Such a structure
has been defended on the grounds that higher-income workers
have additional sources o f retirement income, whereas lower-income workers are likely to be more heavily dependent on Social
Security as a means o f support in retirement. It also reflects the
fact that the primary emphasis in the Social Security system is on
25. Report on Earnings Sharing Implementation Study, p. 17.
26. Report on Earnings Sharing Implementation Study, p. 22.
27. Report on Earnings Sharing Implementation Study, chapters IV and V.
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“ social adequacy” (see the earlier discussion on the philosophy o f
Social Security).
As a result o f the current benefit structure, lower-wage earners
receive a “ return” on their tax contributions that is much greater
than would be justified under a strict actuarial computation. These
windfall benefits are in reality a form o f wealth transfer payments
from the higher-wage earner to the lower-wage earner. Wealth
transfer payments are most often justified as being appropriate in
the Social Security program because they provide the elderly with
transfer payments that are devoid o f the stigma attached to direct
welfare payments.
The use o f the Social Security program to fund transfer pay
ments means that higher-wage earners must accept a lower return
on their Social Security contributions. Current retirees at all wage
levels could, to date, expect to receive retirement benefits in excess
o f an “ actuarially fair” benefit. As the Social Security tax burden
increases, however, the promise o f receiving an “ actuarially fair”
benefit is less likely to be fulfilled for many future retirees. This
relationship o f benefits to contributions is explored more fully in
chapter 2.

28. See, for example, Robert J. Meyers, Social Security (Homewood, IL: Richard
D. Irwin, 1985), pp. 306-308, 462-465, 478-483 and Edmund Outslay and James
E. Wheeler, “ Separating the Annuity and Income Transfer Elements o f Social
Security,” The Accounting Review, October 1982, pp. 716-733.
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An Annuity Analysis of the
Current Social Security
Benefit Program
An alternative approach to the present computation o f Social
Security benefits is to replace the existing stratified (three-tiered)
benefit formula with a uniform benefit schedule that is based on
the total contributions o f each individual to the retirement system.
Total contributions would include both the employee- and em 
ployer-paid contributions plus a real rate o f return. Retirees would
be given a choice o f the following options at retirement: (1) a jointand-survivor annuity, (2) a single-life annuity, or (3) an annuity
with a guaranteed refund feature.
The purpose o f this chapter is to compare the benefit structure
o f the current Social Security program with the benefits that would
be payable under an annuity approach. Such a comparison will
illustrate the extent to which wealth transfers (welfare) exist under
the current program and provide a point o f reference in evaluating
the effects o f adopting an annuity approach. It should be pointed
out that this analysis uses the currently scheduled tax rates in the
computation o f the worker’s contribution to the retirement system.
The appropriate tax rates to impose under an annuity approach
would be determined by the level o f benefits that is deem ed nec
essary to provide beneficiaries with a determined minimum level
o f income. The current rates are used in this analysis solely as a
measure o f comparison o f the current benefit structure with an
annuity-based benefit structure.
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Defining an Annuity Approach
The model used to represent the annuity approach is presented
in exhibit 2.1. The components o f each o f the equations in the
model and the necessary underlying assumptions are discussed in
this section. Before this is done, however, an overview o f the
overall contents and intent o f the model is presented.
The objective o f the model is to compute the annuity returns
to groups o f workers who have paid into Social Security under
different assumptions about wage levels, family wage-earner com 
positions, working periods, and interest rates. The annuity returns
computed take into account inflation indexing o f the benefits and
guaranteed rates o f return, and thus differ from private market
annuities in that respect.
The first equation (equation 1 in the model) calculates the fund
amount that would be “credited” to a worker upon retirement at
age 65 (the Social Security system would presumably still operate
on a “ pay-as-you-go” basis). This credited amount will be depen
dent upon the level o f the worker s wages (wi) subject to the Social
Security tax, the rate o f tax (ti), and the compound interest rate
(rk). Survival probabilities are not included in this formula because
the focus is on those participants who reach retirement (entitle
ment) age.
The second two equations in the model (equations 2 and 3) are
used to compute the cost o f a $1 indexed (price-level-adjusted)
annuity-due at age 65 for either a single-life annuity (equation 2)
or a joint-and-two-thirds survivor annuity (equation 3). The jointand-two-thirds survivor annuity is equivalent to the dependent’s
provisions o f the current Social Security program in which spouses
may jointly receive 150 percent o f the benefit o f the spouse with
the larger benefit while both are alive, with the survivor receiving
100 percent o f the benefit after one o f the spouses dies.
Equations 2 and 3 are referred to in actuarial science as “ com 
mutation functions.” 1 Each o f the terms in these equations is in
standard actuarial notation. Note that survival probabilities (lx) are
factors in the annuity equations because the annuities are paid over
the remaining lives o f the beneficiaries, as are Social Security ben
efits. An assumption about a discounting factor (vx) is also required
in the computation.
1. Chester W. Jordan, Society o f Actuaries’ Textbook on Life Contingencies, 2nd
ed. (Chicago: The Society o f Actuaries, 1967), p. 40.
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Exhibit 2.1
Annuity Com putation M odel

(1)

C e = future value o f contributions accumulated to date

o f entitlement o f worker
wi = worker’s taxed wages in year i
tai = tax rate assessed on worker in year i
tbi = tax rate assessed on worker’s em ployer in year i
s — percentage o f employer-paid tax rate shifted to
the worker
rk = compounding interest rate in year k
e = year o f entitlement to begin collecting benefits
The initial annuity that can be purchased with C e can be
defined as either C e/äx or C e/äxy, where
äx = cost o f $1 o f a single-life annuity-due = N x/D 65

(2)

and

Dx = vx1x
vx = discount factor for some interest rate r

1x

= survival probability factor for age x

and
N x = N x+1 + D x, or the sum o f D x’s from termination

age (age 99) to entitlement age (age 65)
or
axy = cost o f $1 o f a joint-and-two-thirds-survivor
annuity-due = 2/ 3 äx + 2/ 3 äy — 1/ 3 äxy, where

(3 )

äx = single-life annuity-due for a male
ä y = single-life annuity-due for a female
äxy =

joint-life annuity-due for male and female,
defined as N xy/D xy

Source: Edmund Outslay and James E. Wheeler, “ Separating the Annuity and
Income Transfer Elements of Social Security,” The Accounting Review, October
1982, p. 720.
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Once the cost o f $1 o f either annuity-due is calculated, the
annual annuity is computed by dividing the fund available to “pur
chase” the annuity at age 65 (Ce) by the cost o f purchasing a $1
annuity-due. This annuity can then be compared with the Social
Security “ annuity” that would be payable under the current law
given the corresponding wage history for each worker examined.
Differences between the two computations provide a measurement
o f the extent to which current benefits exceed (fall short of) ac
tuarially earned benefits based on lifetime contributions.
The remainder o f this section discusses the components o f each
o f the equations o f the annuity model.

Computing the Future Value of Taxes Paid
Workers o f different wage and family profiles were formed for
two working lifetime periods: 1942 to 1984 and 1985 to 2027. These
groups will allow for comparisons between persons who are retiring
in 1985 and persons who are beginning work in 1985. For each
time period, three sets o f wage histories were analyzed. These
wage histories represent workers earning the (1) federal minimum
wage, (2) average wage subject to Social Security taxation, and (3)
maximum wage subject to Social Security taxation (the wage and
contribution base). Two-wage-earner couples were formed using
the various combinations o f maximum, average, and minimum
wage levels. For years before 1986, the actual wage at each level
was used in the computation. For years after 1985, the three levels
were projected using the Economic Assumptions II-B contained
in the 1985 Annual Report o f the Board o f Trustees o f the OldAge and Survivors Trust Funds.2 The Economic Assumptions
II-B are often referred to as the “ realistic” assumptions in the
Annual Report (as opposed to the “ optimistic” and “ pessimistic”
assumptions). Under Economic Assumptions II-B, the average
earnings in covered employment are projected to level off at an
increase o f 5.5 percent per year beginning in the year 2010. The
real growth in average earnings (nominal growth less the increase
in the CPI) is assumed to be 1.5 percent.
2. 1985 Annual Report of the Board o f Trustees o f the Federal Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance and Disability Trust Funds (Washington, D .C .: U.S. Gov
ernment Printing Office, 1985), p. 28.
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The rate o f tax paid by the worker (as scheduled under current
law) was restricted to only that portion o f the Social Security tax
that is designated for funding retirement benefits (i.e., the old-age
and survivorship portion, hereafter referred to as OASI). As a
simplifying assumption, the OASI taxes were treated as paid at the
beginning o f the year in one lump sum payment. This assumption
will slightly overstate the total future value o f the “ accumulated”
payments at age 65.
The amount o f contributions credited to the worker was cal
culated using just the amount paid by the worker and by using the
combined amount paid by the worker and his or her employer.
Finally, the contributions were compounded using both a 1
percent and a 3 percent real rate o f return assumption. For each
year in which the worker paid taxes, the contributions were com 
pounded by an interest rate composed o f the actual or projected
Consumer Price Index (CPI) rate for that year plus 1 or 3 percent.
The CPI projections for 1985 and beyond were based on Economic
Assumptions II-B used in the 1985 Annual Report o f the Board o f
Trustees o f the Old-Age and Survivors Trust Funds. Under E co
nomic Assumptions II-B, the CPI rate is projected to level off at
an annual increase o f 4 percent by the year 1991. A 1 percent real
rate o f return would be represented by an interest rate o f 5 percent
and a 3 percent real rate o f return would be represented by an
interest rate o f 7 percent.

Computing the Cost of an Annuity-Due
The primary considerations in the computation o f the cost o f a
$1 annuity-due, either single-life or joint-and-two-thirds survivor,
are the interest factor (vx) and the mortality factor (lx). The interest
factor used reflected either a 1 percent or a 3 percent real rate o f
return, corresponding to the real rate o f return used to compute
the “ fund” available to purchase the annuity in equation 1 o f the
model. Because the annuity computed was an inflation-adjusted
annuity (to make it comparable to the social security benefit), the
CPI adjustment was omitted from
(i.e., the interest rate used
was either 1 or 3 percent). The resulting annuity is, therefore,
initially smaller than an annuity that is a level benefit per year.
Unisex mortality rates were used in making the computations and
were obtained from the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Associ
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ation (TIAA).3 These rates tend to be slightly above the national
average because o f the characteristics o f TIAA’s annuitants.
The cost o f a $1 single-life indexed annuity-due under a 1 per
cent real rate o f return assumption was computed to be $18.44.
The cost o f a joint-and-two-thirds survivor option under the same
interest rate assumption was computed to be $19.83. The cost o f
a $1 single-life indexed annuity-due under a 3 percent real rate o f
return assumption was computed to be $15.03, with the corre
sponding joint-and-two-thirds survivor annuity-due costing $16.00.

A Comparison of Social Security
Benefits With an Annuity Approach
The focus o f the analysis in this chapter is on comparing the
Social Security benefits workers can expect to receive under the
current system with benefits computed using the annuity formulas
just discussed. The obvious difference between the two calculations
will stem from the fact that under the current system, benefits are
a function o f lifetime wages subject to Social Security taxation while
the annuity is a function o f lifetime taxes paid.
In this study, the retirement and dependent’s benefits for each
worker or family unit were computed using the benefit (PIA) com 
putation software program developed and supplied by the Office
o f the Actuary o f the Social Security Administration.4 This program
is not the official program used to compute actual benefits, but it
does compute the benefits to be received under different wage
levels. As was the case with the annuity computations, the eco
nomic assumptions needed to project changes in the CPI and the

3. Unisex mortality rates are used in these computations rather than gender
specific mortality rates to be in conformance with the Supreme Court’s decision
in Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Com
pensation Plans V. Norris [103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983)], which mandated the use o f
unisex mortality rates so as not to discriminate against women.
4. Permission to use the software package developed by the Office o f the Ac
tuaries o f the Social Security Administration is acknowledged and greatly appre
ciated. It should not be construed that the Social Security Administration
participated in this study, however.
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average wages subject to the Social Security tax were based on the
1985 Trustees’ Economic Assumptions II-B.
The retirement benefits for the worker were computed under
the assumption that the worker retired at age 65. For workers in
the wage period 1985 to 2027 the “normal” retirement age under
the current law would be age 67. If benefits were elected at age
65, the benefit amount would be reduced by an actuarial factor o f
86.67 percent. In this study, the benefits used for comparison were
not reduced by the actuarial factor. In the case o f family units, it
was assumed the spouses were the same age and applied for ben
efits at the same time.
To be consistent with the Social Security taxes paid assumption,
the Social Security benefit was assumed to be paid at the beginning
o f each year in one lump-sum payment (annuity-due) rather than
as a monthly payment.

Results and Analysis
The results o f the comparisons between the Social Security
benefit to be received and the corresponding annuity that the tax
contributions could “ purchase” are presented in tables 2.1 through
2.4. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 portray the results for single-wage earners
and married couples with one- and two-wage earners o f various
income levels who began working in 1942 and are retiring in 1985.
Table 2.1 presents the results under a 1 percent real rate o f return
assumption and table 2.2 presents the results under a 3 percent
real rate o f return assumption. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 repeat the same
comparisons for single and married couple wage earners who began
working in 1985 and will retire in the year 2028.
Column 1 o f each table lists the worker status and wage levels
o f each worker. The second column lists the “ fund” that would be
credited to the worker(s) upon retirement if the Social Security
taxes paid were deemed to accumulate at the prescribed real rate
o f interest. This amount takes into account the Social Security taxes
paid by both the worker and the worker’s employer. If just the
worker’s contributions were taken into account, the amount would
be half o f the listed amount. It must be stressed again that this
analysis uses the currently scheduled OASI tax rates in making
this computation.
Column 3 provides the retirement benefit that the workers
would be entitled to given their respective wage histories. Column
41
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Future Value
o f Taxes Paid

$ 22,52 1 .4 4
4 6 , 896.84
71, 704.84

$ 2 2 ,5 2 1 .4 4
4 6 , 869.84
71, 704.84
45,04 2 .8 8
69,391 .2 8
9 4 ,226.28
9 3 ,7 3 9 .6 8
118, 574.68
143,4 09.68

Worker Status
and Wage Levels

Single
Min. W age
Avg. W age
Max. W age

Married
M in/$0
A vg/$0
Max/$0
M in/M in
Min/Avg
Min/Max
Avg/Avg
Avg/Max
Max/Max
$ 6 ,6 5 1 .0 0
9 ,8 7 1 .2 0
12,909.60
8 ,8 6 8 .0 0
1 1,014.80
13,040.40
13,161.60
15,187.20
17,212.80

$ 4 ,4 3 4 .0 0
6 ,5 8 0 .8 0
8 ,6 0 6 .4 0

OASI
Benefit

$ 1 ,135.73
2 ,3 2 3 .2 0
3 ,6 1 5 .9 8
2 ,2 7 1 .4 5
3 ,4 9 9 .3 1
4 ,7 5 1 .7 0
4 ,7 2 7 .1 6
5 ,9 7 9 .5 6
7 ,2 3 1 .9 6

$ 1 ,221.34
2 ,5 4 1 .7 5
3 ,8 8 8 .5 5

Annuity
Benefit

Table 2.1
OASI and Annuity Benefit Computations
For Workers Retiring in 1985
1% Real Rate o f Return Assumption

5 .8 6 (11.71)
4 .2 5 ( 8.50)
3 .5 7 ( 7.14)
3 .9 0 ( 7.81)
3 .1 5 ( 6.30)
2 .7 4 ( 5.49)
2 .7 8 ( 5.56)
2 .5 4 ( 5.08)
2 .3 8 ( 4.76)

3 .6 3 ( 7.26)
2 .5 9 ( 5.18)
2 .2 1 ( 4.43)

OASI/Annuity
Ratio
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Future Value
of Taxes Paid
$ 30,777.34
64,353.20
93,433.18
$ 30,777.34
64,353.20
93,433.18
61,554.68
95,130.54
124,210.52
128,706.40
157,786.38
186,866.36

Worker Status
and Wage Levels

Single
Min. Wage
Avg. Wage
Max. Wage

Married
Min/$0
Avg/$0
Max/$0
Min/Min
Min/Avg
Min/Max
Avg/Avg
Avg/Max
Max/Max
$ 6,651.00
9,871.20
12,909.60
8,868.00
11,014.80
13,040.40
13,161.60
15,187.20
17,212.80

$ 4,434.00
6,580.80
8,606.40

OASI
Benefit

$ 1,923.58
4,022.08
5,839.57
3,847.17
5,945.66
7,763.16
8,044.15
9,861.65
11,679.15

$ 2,047.73
4,281.65
6,216.45

Annuity
Benefit

Table 2.2
OASI and Annuity Benefit Computations
for Workers Retiring in 1985
3% Real Rate o f Return Assumption

3.46 (6.92)
2.45 (4.91)
2.21 (4.42)
2.31 (4.61)
1.85 (3.71)
1.68 (3.36)
1.64 (3.27)
1.54 (3.08)
1.47 (2.95)

2.16 (4.33)
1.54 (3.07)
1.38 (2.77)

OASI/Annuity
Ratio
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Married
M in/$0
Avg/$0
Max/$0
M in/M in
M in/Avg
Min/Max
Avg/Avg
Avg/Max
Max/Max

Single
Min. W age
Avg. W age
Max. W age

Worker Status
and Wage Levels

$

$

286,666.12
7 3 1,269.50
1,683,579.64
5 73,332.24
1 ,0 17,935.60
1 ,9 70,245.70
1 ,4 62,539.00
2,4 1 4 ,8 4 9 .1 0
3 ,3 6 7 ,1 5 9 .2 0

286,666.12
7 31,269.50
1 ,683,579.64

Future Value
of Taxes Paid

$ 5 6 ,7 6 4 .8 0
1 00,252.80
1 57,692.60
7 5 ,6 8 6 .4 0
1 04,678.40
1 57,692.15
133,670.40
171,963.60
210 ,2 5 6 .8 0

$ 3 7 ,8 4 3 .2 0
6 6 ,8 3 5 .2 0
1 05,128.40

OASI
Benefit

$ 14,45 6 .1 8
3 6 ,8 7 6 .9 3
8 4 ,9 0 0 .6 3
2 8 ,9 1 2 .3 7
5 1 ,3 3 3 .1 1
9 9 ,3 5 6 .8 2
7 3 ,7 5 3 .8 6
12 1 ,7 7 7 .5 6
1 6 9 ,801.27

$ 1 5 ,5 4 5 .8 9
3 9 ,6 5 6 .7 0
9 1 ,3 0 0 .4 1

Annuity
Benefit

Table 2.3
OASI and Annuity Benefit Computations
for Workers Beginning W ork in 1985
1% Real Rate o f Return Assumption

3 .9 3 (7.85)
2 .7 2 (5.44)
1.86 (3.71)
2 .6 2 (5.24)
2 .0 4 (4.08)
1.59 (3.17)
1.81 (3.62)
1.41 (2.82)
1.24 (2.48)

2 .4 3 (4.87)
1.69 (3.37)
1.15 (2.30)

OASI/Annuity
Ratio
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Married
M in/$0
A vg/$0
M ax/$0
M in/M in
M in/Avg
M in/M ax
Avg/A vg
Avg/M ax
Max/Max

Single
Min. W age
Avg. W age
Max. W age

Worker Status
and Wage Levels

$

$

443 ,8 5 9 .2 6
1,1 2 2 ,4 8 1 .8 0
2 ,5 2 9 ,4 1 1 .0 0
8 8 7 ,718.52
1,5 6 6 ,3 4 1 .1 0
2 ,9 7 3 ,2 7 0 .3 0
2 ,2 4 4 ,9 6 3 .6 0
3 ,6 5 1 ,8 9 2 .8 0
5 ,0 5 8 ,8 2 2 .0 0

443 ,8 5 9 .2 6
1 ,122,481.80
2 ,5 2 9 ,4 1 1 .0 0

Future Value
of Taxes Paid

$ 5 6 ,7 6 4 .8 0
1 0 0,252.80
1 5 7,692.60
7 5 ,6 8 6 .4 0
104,678.40
1 5 7,692.15
1 3 3,670.40
1 7 1 ,963.60
2 1 0 ,2 5 6 .8 0

$ 3 7 ,8 4 3 .2 0
6 6 ,8 3 5 .2 0
1 0 5 ,128.40

OASI
Benefit

$ 2 7 ,7 4 1 .2 0
7 0 ,1 5 5 .1 2
15 8 ,0 8 8 .1 9
5 5 ,4 8 2 .4 0
9 7 ,8 9 6 .3 2
18 5 ,8 2 9 .3 9
1 4 0 ,310.23
2 2 8 ,2 4 3 .3 0
3 1 6 ,1 7 6 .3 8

$ 2 9 ,5 3 1 .5 5
7 4 ,6 8 2 .7 6
168 ,2 9 0 .8 2

Annuity
Benefit

Table 2.4
OASI and Annuity Benefit Computations
for Workers Beginning Work in 1985
3% Real Rate o f Return Assumption

2 .0 5
1.43
1.00
1.36
1.07
0 .8 5 *
0 .9 5 *
0 .7 5 *
0 .6 6 *

(4.09)
(2.86)
(1.99)
(2.73)
(2.14)
(1.70)
(1.91)
(1.51)
(1.33)

1.28
(2.56)
0 .8 9 * (1.79)
0 .6 2 * (1.25)

OASI/Annuity
Ratio

Notes to the Preceding Tables
1. The wages for married couples are the various combinations of the
three wage levels computed for single workers (i.e., Min/Min rep
resents a two wage-earner couple who both earned at the minimum
wage level).
2. The future value of taxes paid includes both the employer- and em
ployee-paid amounts.
3. The annuity benefit is computed as a single life for single workers and
a joint and two-thirds survivor for married workers.
4. The OASI/Annuity benefit ratio is computed for both the combined
employer and employee contribution and the employee contribution
alone (in parentheses).
5. The OASI benefit for married retirees is computed using the greater
of the actual combined benefits or 150% of the benefit of the spouse
with the greater earnings for purposes of the dependency benefit.
6. Ratios of less than 1.00 (marked with an *) indicate situations in which
the Social Security benefit is less than the annuity that could be “pur
chased” with the “fund” of contributions accumulated at the date of
retirement.

4 then lists the price-level adjusted annuity benefit that could be
“ purchased” with the “fund” from column 2. Finally, the retire
ment benefit in column 3 is divided by the annuity benefit from
column 4, with the resulting ratio presented in column 5. The first
ratio presented is computed using the total amount from column
2 (the combined taxes paid by the worker and the worker s em 
ployer). The second ratio takes into account only the funds con
tributed by the worker. This ratio measures the extent to which
the Social Security benefit exceeds or falls short o f the annuity
benefit. Ratios in excess o f 1.00 indicate situations in which the
Social Security benefit contains a transfer welfare payment.
It is apparent from tables 2.1 and 2.2 that workers o f all income
levels and marital statuses who retired in 1985 expected to receive
an income transfer payment through the Social Security system
under either a 1 or 3 percent real rate o f return assumption. As
one would expect given the skewness in the benefit structure to
ward low-income wage earners, the transfer element is greatest in
payments to workers at the minimum wage and to couples in which
only one wage earner is present (due to the dependency provision).
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Wage earners at the maximum covered wage receive the smallest
element o f transfer payment as a percentage o f the total payment.
In nominal dollars, however, the maximum-wage earners receive
a transfer payment that exceeds the transfer payment received by
low-wage earners (e.g., the transfer payment made to a single
wage earner at the minimum wage assuming a 1 percent real rate
o f return is $3,212.66, whereas the transfer payment made to a
single-wage earner at the maximum covered wage is $4,717.85).
It is also apparent from tables 2.1 and 2.2 that the real rate o f
return assumption has a significant effect on the ratios o f Social
Security benefit to annuity. Although the Social Security benefit
is not affected by the assumption changes, the annuity benefit is
dramatically affected. The ratios under a 3 percent real rate o f
return assumption are 60 to 70 percent o f the ratios under a 1
percent real rate o f return.
For workers who began work in 1985 (at age 22), the “ returns”
from the Social Security system are much less generous than those
received by workers who retired in 1985. Much o f this is due to
the fact that the Social Security tax burden will be much greater
on beginning workers during their entire working lives than was
the case for workers who spent the majority o f their working lives
in the 1940s through the 1960s. Workers who expect to retire in
2028 will still receive a transfer payment under a 1 percent real
rate o f return. However, single-wage earners at the average and
maximum wage levels, and married two-wage-earner couples who
have at least one spouse at either the average or maximum wage
levels can expect to start “ subsidizing” the Social Security system
under a 3 percent real rate o f return. For example, a two-wageearner couple where each spouse earns the maximum covered wage
can expect to receive a Social Security benefit that is only 66 per
cent o f what their tax contributions could “ purchase” in a pricelevel adjusted annuity. If their employers’ contributions are ig
nored, there would be a transfer payment to the couple.
It should also be reiterated in this discussion o f benefit ratios
that the actuarial reduction factor for persons retiring before age
67 has been ignored for the analysis o f workers retiring in 2028.
If the actuarial reduction factor o f 86.67 percent was applied to the
Social Security benefit (as would be the case under current law),
the OASI/Annuity ratio would decline even further for the 2028
retirees. For a two-wage-earner married couple, the ratio would
decline from 66 to 58 percent under a 3 percent real rate o f return
assumption.
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The bias in the current benefit structure in favor o f singlewage-earner families is also evident from the tables. The effect o f
the dependency provision in the current law can be seen by com 
paring the taxes paid and the benefits received by single-wageearner couples to the corresponding amounts paid and received
by two-wage-earner couples. A single-wage-earner couple where
the working spouse earns at the average covered wage can expect
to receive an OASI benefit o f $100,252.80 when they retire in
2028. A two-wage-earner couple where both spouses earn at the
average covered wage can expect to receive an OASI benefit o f
$133,670.40 (or 33 percent more than the one-wage-earner couple).
The total Social Security taxes paid by the two-wage-earner couple
would be twice that paid by the one-wage-earner couple, however.

Other Approaches to the "Money's Worth" Question
There are other ways in which to address the issue as to whether
the Social Security program provides its participants with a “ good
deal.” In the most frequent case, the “ expected future value” o f
the participant’s tax payments is compared to the “expected present
value” o f the participant’s Social Security benefits.5 A participant
is deemed to receive his or her “ money’s worth” from Social Se
curity if the present value o f the expected benefits is at least equal
to the future value o f the expected tax payments.
This approach differs from the annuity approach presented in
this analysis in that mortality considerations are taken into account
in computing the future value o f the tax payments. The annuity
analysis assumed the worker reached the age o f 65. By applying
mortality rates to the tax payments, one can calculate the expected
“well-offn ess” o f the participant at the beginning o f his or her
entrance into the system. There is much validity to this approach,
and readers are advised to investigate those studies as well. The
annuity approach was chosen for this study because it more clearly

5. See, for examples, Robert J. Meyers, Social Security (Homewood, IL: Richard
D. Irwin, 1985), pp. 306-308, 462-465, 478-483; Richard V. Burkhauser and
Jennifer L. Warlick, Disentangling the Annuity from the Redistributive Aspects
o f Social Security (Madison, WI: Institute for Research on Poverty, Discussion
Paper No. 562); and Orlo R. Nichols and Richard G. Schreitmueller, Some Com
parisons of the Value of a Worker’s Social Security Taxes and Benefits (Social
Security Administration Actuarial Note No. 95, April 1978).
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delineates the “ earned” from the “ unearned” portions o f the cur
rent Social Security benefit provisions. It also illustrates the dif
ferences that could occur in the distribution o f retirement benefits
from the Social Security trust funds if an annuity approach were
adopted. Although lower-wage earners would receive less in direct
payments from the Social Security trust funds, it should not be
assumed that their total payments would be less under an annuity
plan. If additional payments were deem ed necessary to bring these
persons to a predetermined level o f household income, such pay
ments could be forthcoming from general revenues, not the Social
Security trust funds.

Caveats and Implications
Studies such as this, which project wage streams and interest
rates into the future, are subject to assumptions that may or may
not prove to be accurate. The assumption o f interest rates was
shown to have a significant effect on the results in the previous
study. However, given that the same assumptions are used to
compute both the annuity and the OASI benefit, comparisons o f
the relative magnitude o f the two amounts do provide a valid frame
work for evaluating the effects o f adopting an annuity approach.
To this point, beneficiaries who reach retirement age can expect
to receive a retirement benefit that is well in excess o f the benefit
that would be paid if actuarially determined. This phenomenon is
not expected to continue in the future for all workers. Should
inflation increase in the future relative to wage growth or should
taxes have to be increased in the future (as they will under the
present structure), high- and average-wage earners will receive a
retirement benefit that is even further diminished when compared
to an actuarially determined amount.
This study makes no recommendation as to what should be the
level o f taxes paid or what should be a target retirement figure.
Comparisons are made using the legislatively scheduled tax rates.
If an annuity approach were to be adopted, it would be incumbent
upon policymakers to decide on an appropriate replacement rate
target for the retirement benefits provided through the Social Se
curity system. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 provide an analysis o f the current
replacement rates that are produced by the Social Security system
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6,968.00
16,135.07
37,800.00
13,969.00
23,103.07
44,768.00
32,270.14
53,935.07
75,600.00

$ 6,968.00
16,135.07
37,800.00

Preretirement
Wage*

$ 6,651.00
9,871.20
12,909.60
8,868.00
11,014.80
13,040.40
13,161.60
15,187.20
17,212.80

$ 4,434.00
6,580.80
8,606.40

OASI
Benefit

95.5
61.2
34.2
63.6
47.7
29.1
40.8
28.2
22.8

63.6
40.8
22.8

OASI as a Percentage
o f Preretirement Wage

*The amount in this column is the wage(s) earned by the worker(s) in the year before retirement (i.e., the
wage earned at age 64).

Avg/Max
Max/Max

Avg/Avg

Married
Min/$0
Avg/$0
Max/$0
Min/Min
Min/Avg
Min/Max

Single
Min. Wage
Avg. Wage
Max. Wage

Worker Status
and Wage Levels

Table 2.5
Current Social Security Benefits as a
Percentage o f Preretirem ent Incom e
for W orkers Retiring in 1985
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$ 56,764.80
100,252.80
157,692.60
75,686.40
104,678.40
157,692.15
133,670.40
171,963.60
210,256.80

$ 37,843.20
66,835.20
105,128.40

OASI
Benefit

88.5
61.7
41.3
59.0
46.2
35.3
41.2
31.6
27.5

59.0
41.2
27.5

OASI as a Percentage
o f Preretirement Wage

*The amount in this cx)lumn is the wage(s) earned by the worker(s) in the year before retirement (i.e., the
wage earned at age 64).

64,106.66
162,357.20
382,200.00
128,213.32
226,463.86
446,306.66
324,714.40
544,557.20
764,400.00

$ 64,106.66
162,357.20
382,200.00

Single
Min. Wage
Avg. Wage
Max. Wage

Married
Min/$0
Avg/$0
Max/$0
Min/Min
Min/Avg
Min/Max
Avg/Avg
Avg/Max
Max/Max

Preretirement
Wage*

Worker Status
and Wage Levels

Table 2.6
Current Social Security Benefits as a
Percentage o f Preretirem ent Incom e
for W orkers Beginning W ork in 1985

for the same groups o f workers that were previously discussed. It
is apparent from these two tables that lower-wage earners and
single-wage-earner families have much higher replacement rates
than higher-wage-earner families. In the extremes, the singlewage-earner family at the minimum wage will have 88.5 to 95.5
percent o f their final year’s preretirement wages replaced by their
Social Security benefits. On the other hand, the single maximumwage earner will have only 22.8 to 27.5 percent o f his or her final
year’s preretirement wage replaced by the Social Security benefit.
This again reflects the fact that the benefit structure is heavily
weighted toward the lower-wage earner.
Regardless o f whether benefits were to be lowered, it will be
important to educate workers on the role o f the Social Security
program in the total retirement scheme (along with private savings
and employer-provided pensions). The next chapter puts the cur
rent relationship o f Social Security to the other forms o f retirement
income in perspective.
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3
Social Security and Its Role in
a National Retirement
Income Policy
The "Three-legged Stool"
The components o f retirement income policy in the United
States have often been referred to as comprising a “ three-legged
stool.” The three legs o f this stool consist o f government payments
(most notably Social Security), employee pension plans, and private
savings. Occasionally, a fourth leg consisting o f earned income
(wages) is added to the stool.
Each o f these components o f retirement income is important
to consider in the formulation o f a retirement income policy. Fre
quently, the source and amount o f income from one component
will have an effect on the amount o f income received from another
component (e.g., earned income may reduce the amount o f Social
Security benefits received under the retirement test, or the amount
o f Social Security benefit received may reduce the amount o f pen
sion benefit received if the plan is integrated with Social Security).
Government policies toward the components o f retirement income
often fail to take into consideration the impact o f legislation on the
other components o f retirement income. In addition, tax policies
toward each component are inconsistent with each other. This
chapter briefly describes the role o f each component o f retirement
income, especially with regard to its relationship to the Social
Security system. Special emphasis is given to the tax policies that
aff ect each component and how they might be made more con
sistent.
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Social Security
The Social Security Program was signed into law in 1935 by
President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The call for a national income
security program was given a sense o f urgency due to the economic
catastrophe that befell millions o f Americans in the Great Depres
sion. As originally envisioned, Social Security was designed to pro
vide a basic floor o f protection for workers who suffered a loss o f
wage income due to death, disability, or retirement. Subsequent
to its enactment, and prior to the payment o f any benefits, the
Social Security program was modified to include the spouses and
dependents o f workers in its coverage. 1 Since its implementation,
the program has been modified many times, with the most frequent
changes being to liberalize benefits and expand the classes o f work
ers covered by the system. Today, more than 90 percent o f the
working population is subject to Social Security taxation.

Employee Pension Plans
The first noncontributory company-provided pension plan was
established in the United States by the American Express Company
in 1875.2 However, the growth in employee pension plans did not
becom e significant until the 1940s and 1950s. This period after
World War II saw an increase in corporate profits and a significant
increase in corporate tax rates, thus creating incentives for com 
panies to “ shelter” some o f their profits by investing in company
pension plans. In addition, the adequacy o f Social Security benefits
declined during this period and organized labor exerted pressure
on companies to include an employee pension plan as part o f their
fringe benefit packages.3 Finally, companies began to view pension
plans as one part o f a broader social responsibility to their em
ployees.4

1. See Martha Derthick, Policymaking for Social Security (Washington, D .C .:
The Brookings Institution, 1979) for a more detailed discussion o f the history o f
the Social Security program.
2. William C. Greenough and Francis P. King, Pension Plans and Public Policy
(New York; Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 27.
3. Alicia Munnell, The Economics of Private Pensions (Washington, D .C .: The
Brookings Institution, 1982), pp. 12-13.
4. President’s Commission on Pension Policy, Coming o f Age: Toward a National
Income Policy (Washington, D .C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 12.
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Employee pension plans in the United States increased from
approximately 15 percent o f the nonagricultural workforce in 1940
to approximately 41 percent in 1960. Since 1960, however, the
participation level has grown at a much slower rate so that, by
1983, approximately 48.5 percent o f the nonagricultural workforce
was covered by a plan.5 There are those who claim that such figures
are significantly understated because they include many young
people who have few years in the workforce and part-timers or
low-paid workers in small businesses.6 These persons contend that
the more realistic figure to use approaches 70 percent o f the full
time American workers age 25 and older. Statistics provided in
table 3.1 by the Joint Committee on Taxation tend to support that
argument. According to the table, the percentage o f workers who
are covered by employer-provided pension plans exceeds 75 per
cent for workers earning $20,000 and above. For workers earning
less than $5,000, the percentage drops to 8.8 percent.
In the previous decade there has been significant government
legislation o f pension plans. Beginning with the Employee Retire
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) o f 1974 and continuing through
the Retirement Equity Act o f 1984, the government has attempted
to safeguard the rights o f employees from discriminatory plans that
would favor higher-paid employees. Such safeguards have often
been attained with a high price o f complexity, however.

Private Savings
Tax incentives to encourage private savings through the use o f
tax deferred savings accounts (i.e., Individual Retirement Ac
counts, or IRAs) were first introduced in ERISA in 1974. These
savings accounts were available only to persons who were not cov
ered by an employer-provided pension plan. In the Economic Re
covery Tax Act (ERTA) o f 1981, these plans were extended to all
employees, regardless o f whether they were covered by an em 
ployer-provided plan. In addition, the amount that could be shel
tered from current taxation was expanded, as was the amount that
could be invested in the retirement account o f a spouse who had
no earned income for the year. As one might expect, the greatest
5. Joint Committee on Taxation, Tax Reform Proposals: Pensions and Deferred
Compensation (JCS-33-85), August 5, 1985, p. 6.
6. President’s Commission on Pension Policy, p. 63.
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Table 3.1
Distribution o f Total Nonagricultural W age and Salary Workers
With Employer Pension Plans, 1983

Wage and Salary Class
Less than $5,000
$ 5 ,0 0 0 -$ 1 0 ,0 0 0
$ 1 0 ,0 0 0 -$ 2 0 ,0 0 0
$ 2 0 ,0 0 0 -$ 3 0 ,0 0 0
$ 3 0 ,0 0 0 -$ 5 0 ,0 0 0
Over $50,000
Total

Total Wage
and Salary
Workers
(000s)

Workers With EmployerProvided Pension Plan
Number
(000s)

Workers

17,766
16,961
29,9 2 6
16,103
8 ,5 4 4
2,0 8 8

1,568
4 ,9 0 8
17,405
12,216
6 ,6 7 2
1,529

8 .8
2 8 .9
5 8 .2
7 5 .9
7 8.1
7 3 .2

91,3 8 8

4 4 ,2 9 8

4 8 .5

%

Source: Joint Com m ittee on Taxation, Tax Reform Proposals: Pensions
and Deferred Compensation (JCS-33-85), August 5, 1985, p. 6.

participation rates in IRAs come from middle- and upper-income
taxpayers. For 1983, over 66 percent o f the IRA contributions were
made by taxpayers with adjusted gross income over $30,000.7 Ap
proximately 10.4 million taxpayers with adjusted gross income o f
under $50,000 made a contribution to an IRA in 1983.8 A more
complete description o f the contributions made to IRAs by tax
payers o f various income classes is contained in table 3.2, taken
from the Joint Committee on Taxation.

Earned Income
As workers have begun to retire at earlier ages, the size and
importance o f earned income as a source o f income for the aged
has declined. One cause o f this has been the trend toward early
retirement by today’s workers. In a recent study published by the
Government Accounting Office (GAO), it was estimated that ap
proximately 50 percent o f the workers collecting a pension in 1983
7. Joint Committee on Taxation, p. 12.
8. Joint Committee on Taxation, p. 13.
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Table 3.2
Number o f Returns and Amount o f Payment to IRAs
Distributed by Adjusted Gross Income Class, 1983

Adjusted
Gross
Income
Class
($000s)

Returns
Amount o f Payment
As a
% of
No. of
Eligi
Eligi
Aver
ble
No. of ble
Distri age
Re
Re Distri
Re
turns* turns turns bution Total bution Amount
(%)
(%) Amount (%)
(000s) (000s)
($)

Less than 10
10-20
20-30
30-40
40-50
50-100
100-200
200 or more

27,992
645
21,297 2,010
14,781 2,945
9,814 2,860
4,778 2,140
3,979 2,558
523
431
164
130

2.30
9.44
19.92
29.14
44.79
64.29
82.41
79.27

4.70
14.65
21.46
20.84
15.60
18.64
3.14
.95

3.17
11.28
18.63
21.03
17.43
23.30
3.99
1.17

1,588
1,815
2,047
2,379
2,635
2,946
2,998
2,900

83,326 13,721

16.47

100.00 32,348 100.00

2,358

Total

1,024
3,648
6,028
6,804
5,638
7,536
1,292
377

*Eligible returns are returns with wage and salary income.

Source: Joint Committee on Taxation, Tax Reform Proposals: Pensions
and Deferred Compensation (JCS-33-85), August 5, 1985, p. 8.

were age 62 or younger.9 By age 65, this percentage had increased
to 60 percent. Contributing factors to this trend toward early re
tirement must undoubtedly include the increase in benefits pro
vided by the Social Security program starting in the 1970s, coupled
with the built-in disincentives that the program has against earning
wages while collecting such benefits (i.e., the retirement test dis
cussed in detail in chapter 1).
9. General Accounting Office, Retirement Before Age 65 Is a Growing Trend In
The Private Sector (GAO/HRD-85-81) July 15, 1985, p. 4.
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The Role of Each Component of
Retirement Income
One o f the difficult issues that must be resolved in the debate
over a national income policy is the role o f each component o f
retirement income in providing economic security to the elderly.
The sources o f income for taxpayers who were age 65 and older in
1983 are detailed in table 3.3. As one might expect, Social Security
benefits comprise the single largest source o f income to all tax
payers who are age 65 and older. The percentage o f total income
that Social Security provides decreases as income increases. For
taxpayers with less than $10,000 o f adjusted gross incom e, Social
Security provided 55 percent o f the total amount. For taxpayers
in the $50,000 to $75,000 range, Social Security provided only 9
percent o f the total amount. It should be pointed out that over
two-thirds o f the taxpayers examined in table 3.3 had total adjusted
incomes o f less than $10,000. The heavy reliance on Social Security
benefits is particularly acute among elderly unmarried women. The
Social Security Administration reports that in 1982, 20 percent o f
unmarried beneficiary women age 65 and over received 100 per
cent o f their income from Social Security.10 This compares to 17
percent for unmarried beneficiary men and 9 percent o f beneficiary
married couples.
Although Social Security was intended to provide a floor o f
basic protection when it was enacted in 1935, it is obvious that
many retirees view Social Security as their predominant, and fre
quently their sole, means o f retirement support. Despite the sig
nificant increases in Social Security benefits in the past twenty
years, a common complaint often registered by beneficiaries about
Social Security is that it does not provide enough money to live
on. If Social Security is to serve as a floor o f basic protection, then
it becomes important to encourage and strengthen the other legs
o f the retirement stool, employer-provided pensions and individual
savings.
While individual savings decisions often reflect an individual’s
propensity to consume goods and services now or in the future,
the role o f employer-provided pensions is often viewed as a nec
essary supplement to Social Security to provide retirees with a
10. U.S. Department o f Health and Human Services, Report on Earnings Shar
ing Implementation Study (SSA Pub. No. 12-004, January, 1985), p. 10.
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1,462
1,106
575
249
132
207
66
80
28

3,906

Less than $10
$10-$20
$20-$30
$30-$40
$40-$50
$50-$75
$75-$100
$100-$200
$200 and over

Total

49,564

6,294
9,610
8,929
4,716
2,916
5,417
2,691
4,650
4,341

Amount

1,505
786
1,241
370

172
65
66
25
70,364

2,101

222

10,103

36,983
17,313
7,197
2,866

Amount

6,270
2,290
700
294

Returns

Pension
Income*

17,768

12,352
3,012
1,065
435
338
331
103
101
32

Returns

113,154

73,360
22,033
7,793
2,993
2,649
2,464
810
794
259

Amount

Social Security†

10,162

4,027
3,090
1,320
544
435
408
141
149
47

Returns

103,100

16,321
21,068
14,640
8,296
9,252
10,976
5,504
8,452
8,592

Amount

Interest and
Dividends

2,140

425
531
367
229
197
197
73
88
32

Returns

34,616

1,822
1,881
2,235
1,822
1,697
3,624
2,132
4,305
15,100

Amount

Capital Gains

[Returns in thousands; amounts in millions of dollars]

3,780

1,582
840
473
258
179
212
90
107
39

16,677

-1,051
1,661
1,607
1,071
1,082
2,335
1,134
3,063
5,774

Amount

Other Income
Returns

19,574 387,475

13,076 133,729
3,379 73,566
1,360 42,401
563 21,764
440 19,697
420 26,321
141 13,057
149 22,505
47 34,436

Amount

Total
Returns

Source: Joint Committee on Taxation,

Tax Reform Proposals: Pensions and Deferred Compensation

(JCS-33-85), August 5, 1985, p. 3.

*Includes private and public pensions plus military retirement benefits,
†Includes social security and railroad retirement benefits.
Note: Estimated at 1983 income levels for taxable and nontaxable returns where the principal taxpayer is age 65 or over. Also included are estimated data for nonfilers. Detail
may not add totals due to rounding.

Returns

Adjusted
Gross Income
(thousands)

Wages and
Salaries

Table 3.3
Sources o f Income for Returns o f Taxpayers Age 65 or Over

retirement level that is somewhat better than a subsistence level.
In many cases, however, employer-provided pension plans are
integrated with Social Security such that lower-income employees
receive a decreased amount o f pension relative to higher-income
persons because the Social Security benefit structure is weighted
toward the low-wage earner. In the most frequent type o f pension
plan (integration using the “ offset approach” ), a portion o f the em 
ployee’s Social Security benefit reduces the benefits payable under
the pension plan.11 Rather than enhance the Social Security benefit
received by all employees, such integration plans tend to favor
those higher-income employees whose replacement income rate
from Social Security is lower.
Included in the debate over the roles o f the sources o f retire
ment income is the level at which preretirement income should
be replaced. Munnell estimates that retirees require 50 to 80 per
cent o f their preretirement earnings to maintain their living stand
ards.12 This reduction in income requirements is due to a decrease
in tax burden and a decrease in work-related expenses. Some pol
icymakers, most notably the President’s Commission on Pension
Policy in 1981, have advocated a goal o f maintaining the retiree’s
preretirement standard o f living during retirement.13 Others, such
as Munnell, argue that such a goal is not feasible.14
Regardless o f the replacement level chosen as a target, there
still exists the question as to whether employer-provided pension
plans should be required o f all employers. The President’s Com 
mission on Pension Policy recommended the establishment o f a
Minimum Universal Pension System (MUPS). Under this program,
a minimum pension plan would be required to be established for
all workers over the age o f 25, with one year o f service, and 1,000
hours o f employment with their employer. The contribution to the
pension plan was recommended to be 3 percent o f total payroll.
Vesting o f benefits would be immediate. Small businesses would
be able to take a tax credit o f 46 percent o f their contribution to
a MUPS, up to a limit o f 3 percent o f payroll.15

11. General Accounting Office, Features O f Nonfederal Retirement Programs
(GAO/OCG-84-2), June 26, 1984, p. 5, and Joint Committee on Taxation, pp.
60-64.
12. Munnell, p. 23.
13. President’s Commission on Pension Policy, p. C -4 .
14. Munnell, p. 27.
15. President’s Commission on Pension Policy, pp. 42-43.
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Differences in the Tax Treatment of
Each Component of Retirement Income
The major tax incentive attached to employer-provided pension
plans and IRAs is the opportunity to deduct the amount o f the
contribution to the plan from the current year’s taxable income
and to allow the income earned by the contribution pool to ac
cumulate tax-free over the life o f the investment. W hen income
and capital is later withdrawn from the pool, the amount is fully
taxable. However, it is quite likely that the recipient’s marginal
tax rates at that time will be much lower than those that would
have been imposed on the contribution in the year it was contrib
uted. Penalties exist to discourage, or at least remove the tax ad
vantages from, premature withdrawals from these plans.
During most o f Social Security’s existence, the major tax ad
vantage to the participants was the fact that the entire Social Se
curity retirement benefit was excluded from income taxation upon
receipt. Beginning in 1984, up to one-half o f the benefit could be
subject to taxation. Employers are entitled to deduct from their
taxable incomes the entire amount o f the contribution paid on
behalf o f their employees. Employees, however, are not permitted
to deduct any o f their contributions to the Social Security system.
This nondeductibility o f Social Security taxes paid by employees
results in a potentially costly form o f double taxation. Wages are
subject to the payroll tax, which is in turn subject to the federal
income tax. This tax on a tax can be very costly to higher income
wage earners. For example, for a person at the 50 percent marginal
tax rate who is paying the maximum Social Security amount for
1985 ($2,791.80), this second tax amounts to $1,395.90.

The Need for a More Consistent
National Retirement Policy
Future efforts to legislate changes in the tax or other treatment
o f a source o f retirement income should not be done in isolation.
Policymakers need to consider the effects such legislation is likely
to have on the other components o f retirement income and on the
behaviors o f both workers and retirees. Social Security has proven
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to be a much needed program for the elderly, the disabled, and
the dependents o f deceased workers. The program should be sup
ported and maintained for all workers and their families. However,
it is becoming increasingly obvious that demographic changes
threaten to undermine the stability o f the program in the not-toodistant future. The tax rates that will be necessary to support the
program at its current levels will simply be too high for workers
to pay. In light o f this fact, it becomes incumbent on government
to encourage more private sector initiatives to employers and work
ers to provide alternative sources o f retirement income. Workers
must be educated that Social Security will provide only a basic
floor o f protection upon retirement, not an amount that will enable
the beneficiary to maintain a preretirement life-style. The ultimate
level o f retirement income is a decision that each individual has
to make.
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Appendix

Computing the Primary
Insurance Amount Using the
Wage-Indexed Method
The calculation o f the primary insurance amount (PIA) using
the wage-indexed method will be illustrated in this appendix. The
wage-indexed method was introduced in the 1977 Amendments to
the Social Security Act and applies to beneficiaries reaching age
62 after 1978. Under this method, a worker s past wages are ad
justed for changes in the average wage subject to Social Security
taxation to restate the wages in more current terms.

Average Indexed Monthly Earnings
(AIME)
The first step in the computation is to determine a worker’s
average indexed monthly earnings (AIME). The AIM E is computed
in the following manner:
1. The worker’s actual annual covered wages are listed for years
beginning after 1950 or after age 21, whichever is later.
2. The actual wages for the computation years up to and including
the second year before the year in which the worker attains age
62, dies or becomes disabled (whichever is earlier) are indexed
by multiplying the actual wage times the following ratio:
Average co v e re d annual w age in the secon d year p rior to
age 62, death o r disability
Average co v e re d annual w age in the year indexed
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3. Covered wages not indexed are included at their actual
amounts.
4. The computation period consists o f the years beginning after
age 21 or 1950 (whichever is later) and extending up to the year
in which the worker becomes 62, dies, or becomes disabled.
The five years o f lowest (or no) indexed earnings are excluded,
and years o f earnings after age 61 may be substituted for years
o f lower indexed earnings included in the computation period.
5. The AIME is then calculated by dividing the total indexed
annual earnings in the computation period by the number o f
months in the computation period.

Primary Insurance Amount (PIA)
Once the worker’s AIME is computed, the PIA is computed by
applying three separate percentages to increments o f the AIME.
The dollar amounts o f AIME at which the percentage changes are
called “ bend points.” The percentage rates are 90, 32, and 15
percent. The bend points for 1985 are $230 and $1,691. The PIA
also is increased by the changes in the CPI that occur in the years
beginning with age 62 and continuing through the last year worked.

Example
An example will be used to illustrate the operation o f each o f
these computations. The PIA calculation will be made for a worker
earning at the maximum covered wage who was b om on February
1, 1920, and retires on January 1, 1985. The worker is assumed to
begin work on January 1, 1942, and works through the end o f 1984.
Table A .1 lists the worker’s wages subject to Social Security
taxation from 1942 through 1984. Table A.2 presents the calculation
o f the worker’s AIME. Notice that only the wages earned after
1950 enter the calculation. The average covered wage for 1980 (the
second year before the worker turns 62) was $12,513.46. This factor
is used to index the actual wages earned through 1980. The com 
putation period extends from 1951 to 1981. The five lowest indexed
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Table A .1
Maximum Covered Wages for W orker, 1942—1984
Y ea r

E arn in gs

1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

3 ,0 0 0 .0 0
3 ,0 0 0 .0 0
3 ,0 0 0 .0 0
3 ,0 0 0 .0 0
3 ,0 0 0 .0 0
3 ,0 0 0 .0 0
3 ,0 0 0 .0 0
3 ,0 0 0 .0 0
3 ,0 0 0 .0 0
3 ,6 0 0 .0 0
3 ,6 0 0 .0 0
3 ,6 0 0 .0 0
3 ,6 0 0 .0 0
4 ,2 0 0 .0 0
4 ,2 0 0 .0 0
4 ,2 0 0 .0 0
4 ,2 0 0 .0 0
4 ,8 0 0 .0 0
4 ,8 0 0 .0 0
4 ,8 0 0 .0 0
4 ,8 0 0 .0 0
4 ,8 0 0 .0 0
4 ,8 0 0 .0 0
4 ,8 0 0 .0 0
6 ,6 0 0 .0 0
6 ,6 0 0 .0 0
7 ,8 0 0 .0 0
7 ,8 0 0 .0 0
7 ,8 0 0 .0 0
7 ,8 0 0 .0 0
9 ,0 0 0 .0 0
1 0 ,8 0 0 .0 0
1 3 ,2 0 0 .0 0
1 4 ,1 0 0 .0 0
15 ,3 0 0 .0 0
1 6 ,5 0 0 .0 0
1 7 ,7 0 0 .0 0
2 2 ,9 0 0 .0 0
2 5 ,9 0 0 .0 0
2 9 ,7 0 0 .0 0
3 2 ,4 0 0 .0 0
3 5 ,7 0 0 .0 0
3 7 ,8 0 0 .0 0
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Table A.2
Computation o f AIM E for Maximum W age W orker, 1942-1984
Wage-Indexed Formula (1977 Act)

Year

Earnings

1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

3,600.00
3,600.00
3,600.00
3,600.00
4,200.00
4,200.00
4,200.00
4,200.00
4,800.00
4,800.00
4,800.00
4,800.00
4,800.00
4,800.00
4,800.00
6,600.00
6,600.00
7,800.00
7,800.00
7,800.00
7,800.00

9,000.00
10,800.00
13,200.00
14,100.00
15,300.00
16,500.00
17,700.00
22,900.00
25,900.00
29,700.00
32,400.00
35,700.00
37,800.00

Earnings
$12,513.46

Indexed
Earnings

High N
Years

45,048,460.00
45,048,460.00
45,048,460.00
45,048,460.00
52,556,530.00
52,556,530.00
52,556,530.00
52,556,530.00
60,064,610.00
60,064,610.00
60,064,610.00
60,064,610.00
60,064,610.00
60,064,610.00
60,064,610.00
82,588,840.00
82,588,840.00
97,604,990.00
97,604,990.00
97,604,990.00
97,604,990.00
112,621,200.00
135,145,400.00
165,177,700.00
176,439,800.00
191,455,900.00
206,472,100.00
221,488,300.00
286,558,300.00
324,098,600.00

16,093.56
15,150.89
14,349.20
14,275.54
15,919.28
14,878.59
14,431.79
14,305.77
15,577.73
14,989.47
14,697.37
13,996.51
13,661.48
13,125.09
12,892.94
16,723.94
15,841.52
17,517.80
16,560.73
15,777.76
15,022.90
15,786.98
17,828.83
20,568.13
20,442.76
20,750.70
21,112.88
20,982.15
24,962.69
25,900.00
29,700.00
32,400.00
35,700.00
37,800.00

16,093.56
15,150.89
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15,919.28
14,878.59
15,577.73
14,989.47
14,697.37

16,723.94
15,841.52
17,517.80
16,560.73
15,777.76
15,022.90
15,786.98
17,828.83
20,568.13
20,442.76
20,750.70
21,112.88
20,982.15
24,962.69
25,900.00
29,700.00
32,400.00
35,700.00
37,800.00

wages in the period are eliminated, and the three actual wages
earned in 1982, 1983, and 1984 are substituted for three indexed
years because they are higher amounts. This results in eight years
o f indexed earnings being discarded.
The total annual indexed wages for the remaining twenty-six
years is $528,686.70. This amount is divided by 312 months (26
X 12), resulting in an AIME o f $1,694. The PIA is then computed
as follows:
90%
32%
15%

X
X
X

$ 230 = 207 plus
1,461 = 467.52 plus
3 = 0.45

for a total o f $674.97. This amount is increased by the CPI increases
for 1982 (7.4 percent), 1983 (3.5 percent), and 1984 (3.5 percent)
for a total amount o f $776.55. This is rounded down to $776.50.
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